Embassy of the United States

2008 Press Releases

Interview of Ambassador Ryan Crocker by Associated Press Roundtable

February 1, 2008
Washington, D.C.

(9:35 a.m. EST)

QUESTION:  Is there something you wanted to say at the top or can we get right -- so there were these two bombings early this morning, apparently the largest death toll of suicide bombings since the start of the surge.  Can we get some reaction and what you know of, you know, sort of the security situation related to that.  And secondly, does this give you pause as you are -- as you and General Petraeus are considering how many troops you need to have there through July and then thereafter?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  We have been very careful to say that no one's doing victory dances and today's horrific bombings illustrate why that's the case.  Al-Qaida has been damaged, but as we've consistently said, it is still there.  It is resilient and it is a determined enemy.  Their car bomb capabilities have been badly disrupted, so now as we saw today and we've seen for some time, they've been moving toward suicide vests.  In this case, suicide vests worn by women.  There is nothing they won't do if they think it will work in creating carnage and the political fallout that comes from that.

So, you know, we and the Iraqis are going to have to stay on this until this threat is eliminated.  And it's going to be hard.  It's going to be uneven and there are going to be days like today.  At the same time, we all remember a few months ago when it was massive car bombs going up all over the city.  They found a different deadly way to do this, but their capabilities have been diminished and we're just going to have to keep after that.

I was in that area just last week before I came back-- Mutanabbi Street, the Surja Market, Abu Nawas.  What al-Qaida is attempting to do is take away that sense of returning normalcy.  It's our job with the Iraqis to see that they don't.  And it's also, I think, the Iraqi citizens who are not going to let them do this.  They don't have the bases anymore in Baghdad to stage from and certainly what happened today is not going to make them any more popular anywhere in Iraqi with any community.

QUESTION:  What about the U.S. troop level?  Do you think al-Qaida feels emboldened to go out and do more of this sort of thing as there are fewer troops obviously on the streets and in control in Baghdad?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Again, I think, as we have said, as the President has said and the rest of us down the line, our redeployments have to be conditions-based.  There is no way to build the perfect security perimeter, particularly when you're talking about women pedestrian suicide bombers.  But again, we're in the process now of assessment, determining recommendations going forward.  These have not been developed yet.  But what is going to motivate us in all of this has been what has been the watchword in the past, and that's what do the conditions say about what we should do and where we should do it.

QUESTION:  Do you have a current read on that?  What's your -- what are you recommending in your meetings while you're here?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, we're not really -- I haven't really been talking about that here.  I'm kind of looking at the political way ahead.  We've got some way to go before we need to put up the leadership chain, where we should go next on this -- on the question of troop levels.  And I'm certainly not going to preempt that.

QUESTION:  Is that political way ahead, that's Iraqi political way ahead or here and the U.S. political way ahead?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Believe me, I do Iraq.  (Laughter.)

QUESTION:  No, I know.  But given the current environment here and the possible complication of a campaign -- maybe mixed messages that are going to come out as that gets closer.  Are you -- does that play a factor in --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  It really doesn't for me.  Obviously, there is an environment shaped by the 2008 elections, but other people are going to have to figure out what that means.  I'm really full time on Iraq -- on that time zone.

QUESTION:  But is there -- do you think that that will -- will that affect or could it affect what you can do or what you can ask for or what you can --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I won't make those sorts --

QUESTION:  In terms of ---

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  -- of judgments.  I will continue to do what I've been doing since I got there, which is make my best assessments and make my recommendations based on those assessments in an Iraqi context.  Others back here have the responsibility of deciding how they're going to react to that.  But I keep my focus very clearly on Iraq and its regional context, of course.

QUESTION:  Ambassador, you mentioned the assessment going on right now.  Both Generals Petraeus and Odierno have said in recent days that there should be a further period of assessment in July and beyond July before making commitments about further troop withdrawals.  I'm wondering if you share that view and what their logic is underlying that?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I saw the story.  I've been here this week and haven't had a chance to talk to either of them.  As I see it, it's just as I said, we've -- you know, got a couple of months in front of us before we're due back on the Hill and we obviously need to use that time to ground ourselves as well as we can in what we see the situation to be and then what should be done about it.  But I'm certainly not at that point yet.

QUESTION:  Some people out that -- of course the withdrawal of the first group of brigades is just -- there's only one been gone so far, and by the time you come back in April there may be one other.  But it'd still be at the early stage of that transition and maybe -- is it just too soon to know what the fallout will be or the result will be at that point, so therefore you'd need to wait for summer to make a decision.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I just really couldn't say at this point.  We've got a couple of months ahead of us to work on this and that's obviously what we're going to do.  But again, the framework for that is clear -- it's conditions and conditions are complex.  As I look at these things it's not simply assessing what conditions are with respect to the status of Iraqi security forces, sectarian tensions, levels of violence as they are currently.  You've got to take it one dimension further and that's to ask yourself how will any U.S. redeployment change those dynamics because we are -- you know, we're a force field, we're a center of gravity.  Actors and conditions move in a certain pattern when we're there.  If we're not there that pattern is in someway going to change.  So we've got to try to think through to the other side of it, if I'm making that at all clear.  I mean, the fact of a redeployment is going to change conditions on the ground and you have to try to see ahead to be able to answer the question what will it look then, how will the actors react to the reposition and what does it mean.

QUESTION:  How long do you think the U.S. will be the center of gravity?  It seems like that's -- that's a very good way to put it, what the U.S. does is everything.  Do you see a year, two years, three years, four years, five years?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, actually what I've seen in the course of the almost year that I've been out there is a pretty good progression.  I mean, you know, again we all talk about Anbar, but we talk about Anbar for a reason.  If you are in Ramadi now, where I was a couple of weeks ago, going through town it's interesting.  Because in Ramadi, in the city, you don't see American troops.  They're not there.  As a matter of fact, you do not see Iraqi army troops.  They are not there either.  It's Iraqi police.  So in lots of parts of the country the shift toward increasing Iraqi responsibility is already well underway.  I mean, again, with respect to the surge, we put 30,000 additional forces into it.  The Iraqis in the course of 2007 put 110,000 additional forces.  So there is -- I would say a substantial and growing Iraqi center of gravity.  But it's also a fact that wherever we are, the fact that we're there affects conditions and calculations and that's what I mean about thinking through it.

It was pretty clear in Ramadi and it got pretty clear pretty fast that not only could we move out but so too could the Iraqi army, probably a little less clear in many other areas and you've really got to work on this.

QUESTION:  Where do you put Mosul in that?  Have they gotten the memo about the -- sort of doing what the Anbar model would advise?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Mosul is going to be a hard fight, that's already clear.  And again, it comes back to your first question and the comments I made about al-Qaida's resilience.  Out of Anbar, out of Baghdad in the sense of finding areas where they can set up shop, pushed out of many of the areas surrounding Baghdad, so they look where they can go and they've found some space in Mosul.  And that, as I think both the Iraqis and ourselves have made clear, now has to be a main focus to go after them in Mosul.  Because what they have shown is if you leave them alone, they're going to regroup and carry the fight back toward you.  We've carried this to them pretty consistently throughout the last year and that's what we've got to keep doing.  The establishment of -- and then of an operation center in Mosul like they've done in Baghdad, Basrah and Karbala, I think is a good step.  They're flowing additional forces in there.  We've increased as well and that's going to be the next hard fight.

QUESTION:  Is it going to take a greater increase than you've already got in the works with U.S. forces there?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I really couldn't say.

QUESTION:  Why do you think the citizen volunteer movement has not caught on there and does it need to?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I think there are CLCs in Mosul.  I don't have the numbers.  But I would anticipate that there's every chance that as we engage there, as the citizens of Mosul see that there is a concerted determined Iraqi-U.S. effort to get at al-Qaida, there's every chance we're going to see the same kind of phenomena we've seen elsewhere where we've done this.

QUESTION:  What's the impact of the democratic presidential race on your calculation and -- in dealing with the Iraqis and looking ahead to less than a year from now, what will happen?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  What will happen in Iraq?

QUESTION:  Yes.  In terms of -- I mean, you've got both -- Senator Clinton is talking about getting most troops out within a year.  Barack Obama is talking about, you know, doing it faster than that.  I mean, we don't know who's going to win obviously, but you've certainly got to look at that possibility and the Iraqis do, too.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  The tape will show that that -- again, you know, we are looking ahead but maybe in a slightly different way.  One of the things that we need to get done in 2008 is come to an agreement with the Iraqis on our overall bilateral relationship generally and our security relationship in particular.  Because the current Security Council resolution that provides authorities for the multinational force expires December 31st and the Iraqis have stated that this is the last Security Council resolution they want to see.  So we will be working in the course of the coming months to develop a strategic framework agreement to set the parameters for our bilateral relationship and provide a basis for security cooperation that goes beyond the end of 2008 and that is not set out in a Chapter 7 resolution that labels Iraq a threat to international peace and security.  So that's kind of the focus I've got on 2008 going into 2009.

QUESTION:  Will Congress have a say on that agreement?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  We will keep Congress fully informed.

QUESTION:  No, I mean, a break up or down to accept or reject it.  Is it like a treaty?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  We do not at all anticipate that this will be a treaty.  It will be like security agreements we've got with over a hundred countries.  But as we proceed, we're going to consult very closely with Congress.  I've got the responsibility as lead negotiator for this effort and I'm expecting that I will be in front of Congress, in any case, in the next couple of months.

QUESTION:  How about the nominees for the two parties, do you feel an obligation to keep them particularly abreast?  Will they get special briefings?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  That will be up to the folks back here in Washington.

QUESTION:  It's not something that's been talked about yet?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  No.

QUESTION:  Are you back here talking about the planning to go into the negotiations?  When will they actually begin?

AMBASSDOR CROCKER:  Yes, we have been talking about -- again, just as the Iraqis are doing on their side, getting our own team together.  It'll be an interagency effort obviously, trying to figure out what the building blocks of this will be because we need to move out pretty quickly.  I would anticipate an initial round some time this month, I would hope in the next couple of weeks.

QUESTION:  And you anticipate finishing it by summer, is that right?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, we would both like to get this done as soon as possible.  And I think it would be great if that could be by summer.  It has to be done by the end of the year.  But I think we both have a sense of urgency on this -- let's move out as fast as we can with summer as a target.

QUESTION:  Do you anticipate that it would include a limit on the number of American troops who would be present over a period of years?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I don't think it's going to get into numbers at all.  Again, this is intended to be a framework agreement that lays out the kinds of things that we can do and the context in which we will do them, including authorities for operations.  I don't think al-Qaida, for example, is going to have gone away by the end of this year.  And I think we and the Iraqis are going to want to be sure we're able to continue to pursue them.  But questions of force levels and what not, those will be executive decisions by this President and by the next.  And this agreement is in no way going to get into that executive decision prerogative.

QUESTION:  Does the U.S. want to see some specific language then in the ultimate agreement that gives you that flexibility to hunt al-Qaida?  I mean, what would that look like in sort -- I mean, it sort of sounds like the agreements we've got here and there with what the CIA can do and can't do and that sort of thing.  I mean, would it look like that?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, first, that’s why you have negotiations to work these things out -- what we feel we will need, what they feel is appropriate and that’s what you talk about.  What I can tell you is whatever is worked out is going to be fully transparent and in the full light of day.  There aren’t going to be secret agreements or anything that is not out there for the publics of both countries to see. 

QUESTION:  But you do want that kind of flexibility built in? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Again, I think pretty clearly looking ahead, we are going to need and the Iraqis are going to feel we need the authority to conduct combat operations at some level in some manner.  Al-Qaida just is not going to be totally out of business by then, I wouldn’t think. 

QUESTION:  Is – given the unprecedented nature of the – well, except for perhaps Afghanistan and dealing with it, is there a model or something that you can look to to, obviously with revisions for the country specific, is there anything out there that resembles this already?  You talk about security agreements with a hundred other countries, but essentially, you know, there’s no combat going on in South Korea, there’s no combat in Japan, there’s no combat in lots of places where there’s SOFA agreements. 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I think it’s going to be a combination of all of those things.  Again, looking at agreements that we do have because there are going to be elements of those that are probably pretty common across the board, it will be looking at existing authorities which again are granted through the Security Council Resolution, but figuring out how best to carry those forward from a multilateral to a bilateral context.  Looking at precedents in Afghanistan is the one that comes to mind and might be useful there.  But then a lot of this is going to be unique to the situation in Iraq. 

QUESTION:  And what does this do – and what will it do with CPA 17, particularly the contractor issue?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah, the question of immunities?  Yeah, that clearly is going to be part of the negotiation. 

QUESTION:  Is that included in the Afghan agreement? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I don’t know.  I don’t know.  I don’t believe the Afghan agreement goes into detail on the immunity issue. 

QUESTION:  Well, then what do you hope to get on the immunity issue from the Iraqis? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, at this stage, first, we have to carry on with the process.  We’ve gone underway now just on the American side of figuring out how do we want to carry forward – post-Security Council resolution with respect to that issue and then we’re going to have to engage the Iraqis on it.  And I imagine that’s going to be a fairly complex issue of negotiation. 

QUESTION:  President Bush has said that there’ll be a U.S. presence in Iraq, obviously, after he leaves office, he’ll pass it on to the next President.  From – based on what you know and as you look ahead, how far do you see that going? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, that’ll be clearly for the two countries to work out and – on our side for the next President to decide.  But

QUESTION:  How long do you think there’ll be a need? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I just can’t put a clock to the – again, it depends on the need for what, because I think there’s kind of a hierarchy there, a need for combat operations certainly into next year, but how far I couldn't say.  But I think that’s going to be on the short end of the spectrum.  I could see a longer term desire on the part of both countries for a U.S. presence to do train and equip roles.  And possibly depending on what we both work out to have that presence also serve as a, you know, a sort of assurance to Iraq that – about its own security.  But all that’s going to have to be worked out. 

QUESTION:  And you don’t have a gut feeling?  I mean,

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  You know, I – quite honestly, I don’t.  This is something we haven’t done before in this region.  So we’re just going to have to proceed, I think very carefully.  We’re going to have to listen a lot to the Iraqis on this and probably not make a whole heck of a lot of assumptions. 

QUESTION:  In some of these places we’ve talked about – like it’s been said that the White House just looked or refers to a Korea model for Iraq, you know, where we still have troops, what, more than 50 years later.  Is that something that you envision? 

AMBASADOR CROCKER:  Again, what – I think you’re not going to find in this agreement is anything about timelines and, you know, how long to do what.  I think that’s going to have to be kind of a constant process of review and evaluation by both governments going forward.  I don’t know what people were thinking about Korea, say, two years after the armistice.  And I have no idea of what people are going to be thinking about Iraq in Iraq and in the U.S. looking ahead a few years either.  I think again, the governments in place at that time are going to have to make the evaluations, the decisions, the adjustments depending on conditions. 

QUESTION:  Were there some redlines through the United States as you go into these SOFA, or whatever you want to call it, negotiations that you’d think are really going to be a problem for the Iraqis. 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, since we haven’t even yet worked through all of our own positions yet, let alone engaged the Iraqis on them, I probably –you’ll forgive me if I don’t conduct the first round of this negotiation sitting here with you.  So --

QUESTION:  You’ve talked about the immunity issue, though.  I mean, isn’t that --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Oh, clearly, you’re going to have the issue of immunities will be out there.  The – again, the authorities to conduct kinetic operations is going to be out there.  I mean, you can kind of sketch through the headlines. 

QUESTION:  Speaking of examples, I would imagine that the Pakistan example is something you don’t want, where the U.S. – their hands are pretty tied and they can’t do what they want. 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yes.  Having spent some time in Pakistan, but – you know, in Pakistan, we have never had deployed forces.  It just has not been part of the relationship at any stage, including the whole – the period when the Soviets were in Afghanistan and we were working closely with the Pakistanis to support operations against the Soviets.  So it’s never been an element of the relationship -- obviously very different in Iraq.

QUESTION:  If you recall in September, I think, when the President announced his decision about continuing the troop levels.  I believed he asked you and General Petraeus to redesign or re-think the joint campaign plan that you put together last summer.  Has that been done?  Does it – can you talk a little bit about what it – has it changed the – I think the prospect of the – last summer, as I recall it, was that you had said the summer of ’09 is the time when you hoped to achieve sustainable security across the country.  Is that still the goal? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I’d say that’s still a -- that's a direction that we're thinking, yes.  I think that’s still an achievable --

QUESTION:  Has it (inaudible) in some other significant way?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, I’m not going to go into detail on the plan, which is precisely because it is an operational plan.  It’s not a public document.  But it certainly reflects increased focus and priority on kind of the non-security lines of operation, the political, the economic, the diplomatic, in other words, the regional.  We’ve put a lot of thought into that, a lot of focus and resources because, you know, as security improves, then focus has to shift to the improvement of a lot of other things.  I mean, as services need to get delivered, it’s kind of interesting.  When I got to Iraq at the end of March and go around town, everybody was talking about security.  Now, it’s different:  Where's the power?  Where's the water?  Where are the employment opportunities?  What’s the government done for me lately?  So we have to help the Iraqis make some significant improvements in governance, in services to people and the plan reflects that. 

QUESTION:  Is that September ’09 goal doable in your view if -- as the Democrats say they want to yank most troops out within a year?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Again, we have to make some basic planning assumptions to have any ability to plan anything.  And obviously, what we’re thinking of is conditions-based withdrawals, conditions-based redeployments.  That’s the only way we can look at it.  Obviously, we’re not the ones who make the policy decisions, not in this Administration and not in the next one.  And if – you know, if someone wants to, you know, reset the conditions, then obviously we’ll do the best we can within that context.  But those aren’t assumptions that we start with. 

QUESTION:  Can I very briefly just go back to revisit the contractor issue just very briefly?  It’s pretty clear or it’s obvious that you guys cannot do your jobs without these contractors.  But what is the fallout now from the September Blackwater incident?  And you know, are their days there numbered?  Is it that bad with the way the Iraqis see this and – what is the – what’s your thinking about how to go forward, even before the new SOFA is negotiated?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  We have, as you know, taken a number of steps since the September shootings just to ensure that we’ve got the kinds of coordination and oversight and supervision that we need to do the best we can to ensure that nothing like that ever happens again.  That’s also been part of a process of discussion with the Iraqis, because you’re right.  I mean, we do need security contractors to be able to operate there.  And the Iraqis understand this and, of course, they use security contractors themselves.  So it’s – it really is a question more of how do you approach this and in a manner that goes as far as is humanly possible to go in ensuring that you don’t have a repeat of that kind of incident, that you have full respect for Iraqi sovereignty, but you also have the security necessary to get the job done, both for them and for us.  And that’s kind of an ongoing process. 

QUESTION:  I don’t understand how you can have full respect for Iraqi sovereignty, if these people are not a subject to any kind of law? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  And that’s, of course, been something of a debate back here of the revisions to U.S. law to make them accountable here.  I can certainly tell you what my view is, which is that nobody, no American should have a free pass for accountability for actions that could be criminal.  We have to answer somewhere.  And I just feel personally very strongly about that.  Again, not my position to say what that should be, but that it needs to be there.  We – you just can’t have situations in Iraq or anywhere in the world where people can sort of act with impunity and not have to account for it. 

QUESTION:  Congress is going to have to do that, right?  It’s not just a function of the SOFA agreement? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah.  That’s, again -- here I’m kind of private citizen speculation.  I mean, what I keep hearing is that existing mechanisms are not going to do this, that you’re going to need something legislative. 

QUESTION:  Well, what are you – but, you know, the task orders that Blackwater has now come up in May, what’s going to happen? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I don’t know.  You need to ask leadership in this building because that’s – that process will be worked out here. 

QUESTION:  You are leader.  I mean, you’re the guy on the ground who goes out with these people. 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah, but I don’t do the contracting. 

QUESTION:  No, no.  I understand that.  But what would you like to see -- no change? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, clearly –

QUESTION:  Different companies, different uniforms?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, clearly -- they don’t – they don’t wear uniforms. 

QUESTION:  You haven't been there enough to see it, right? 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah. You know, we’re going to go around the table and see who’s spent how much time in Iraq.  Look, the guys that we’ve got out there now are some extraordinary individuals and I’m with them every day.  Last week, the Polish Ambassador decorated about a dozen of them for saving his life back in October.  You know, these are some of the best people in the business and a lot of them have died proving that.  What concerns me is that we have, you know, a continued high standard of security out there.  The contracting processes is something I stay out of.  I simply have the imperative of seeing that at the end of the day, what it delivers is people who can do this job and do it well and that obviously is what motivates the people who make the decisions in this building. 

QUESTION:  Can I ask you a more general question you alluded to a few minutes ago about how the conversation has changed from, you know – (laughter) -- that was pitiful -- from, you know, am I going to get blown up today to, you know, where’s my power and so forth.  But do you – it seems to me that the conversation hasn’t changed that much here, though.  I mean, it’s still, like well, when are they going to pass an oil law and how long are Americans expected to be patient with and paying for an Iraqi political establishment that they’ve repeatedly been assured, well, -- is ready to do all these hard things, but doesn’t really do it.  It – what’s your assessment of that political development and to what extent does that pressure from here, you know, and form what you tell them and how you do things there?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, first, during my time there, I’ve been pretty careful not to be handing out a lot of assurances about positive developments right around the corner.  Iraq is hard.  Just about everything about Iraq is hard.  And there are no quick easy fixes.  I say this repeatedly, but it’s true.  There is no switch to flip.  There is no way to get the puzzle pieces in just the right order and, bang, it all comes together.  It’s going to be one hard issue after another.  That said, you know, we are seeing politics start to work. 

The Council of Representatives over the past month has been I think more active and more focused than it arguably ever has been before.  Debates are pretty raucous.  I mean, it’s politics at work.   But, you know, they have got some things done and I think they’re moving ahead to get some other things done.  They’ve got the accountability and justice bill through.  I think they’re pretty close now on their 2008 budget and I think they’re also pretty close on a provincial powers law which for Americans, that’s something I think we can understand because that will regulate the relations between Baghdad and the provinces on really crucial issues like:  Can a prime minister fire a governor?  Can a governor in conditions of emergency, command federal forces?  I mean, these are existential issues in a federal society and I think they’re pretty close to legislating on that.  The other thing –

QUESTION:  A provincial elections law, though. 

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  There is a draft provincial elections law that has, I understand, been formulated.  And the provincial powers law, when that passes, is going to set the stage for organizing provincial elections. 

There’s also – there’s something else that’s going on that I think is a process rather than an outcome that could have real importance and that’s the decision by the leadership, the president, the two vice presidents, and the prime minister to constitute themselves as an executive council to meet weekly, to have an executive committee of their subordinates that staffs issues up to them.  They’ve done this by fits and starts in the past, but this time, they’ve actually strung together a couple of meetings and in these meetings, have discussed, for example, how they’re going to have a broadly representative approach to the negotiations with us using this mechanism to constitute their team, to discuss an amnesty law, for example, on how to broaden an amnesty law.

QUESTION:  Is that different – that’s different than the presidency council, right?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Exactly.  This is what the old Baghdad hands will remember as the 3+1, the three members of the presidency council plus the prime minister.

QUESTION:  But the presidency council, which was announced with some fanfare, I think, in August or something, hasn't met; is that right?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  No, that’s the 3+1.

QUESTION:  That’s – okay.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  That’s the 3+1.  What they have done is say, okay, we committed to that.  Let’s take it a step further and formalize it as a mechanism.  So that’s – when -- they meet at the executive council, committed to weekly meetings, and then establish this support committee.  So if they can keep that going, I think that’s going to be a very positive contribution to a working political process.

QUESTION:  What is your view of – the current view of the – Iran’s activity, motivation in Iraq and why – it’s been now more than a month since the offer went out for (inaudible).  Nothing has happened.  What’s going on there?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, with respect to the talks, the Iraqis came to us actually, you know, in December to say they’d like another round.

QUESTION:  (Inaudible.)

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah.  I mean --

QUESTION:  So it’s been two months?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah, we came back and said we’re ready to do it.  There were some conflicts with dates and then I thought we were good to go, really, the – right at the 1st of the year and – silence from the audience.  So we’ll see.  My expectation now, based on some of the things we heard just in the last few days from the Iraqis is that the Iranians may now be ready to come back to the table.  And if they are, we’ll be there.  We’re ready to go on this.

QUESTION:  The state of play in terms of their interference or influences, the Iranians now in Baghdad and elsewhere that you’ve talked about in the past, has it improved or --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  You know, it’s like everything else.  It’s complicated and a little bit hard to read.  You know, on the one hand, we’ve seen a falloff in the volume of indirect fire coming into the international zone, which was thought to be Iranian-inspired. 

QUESTION:  Supplied as well, right?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah, clear on that.  There was no question about that.  I mean, we could pick up the pieces, made in Iran.  So on the other, we’re convinced that they continue to train members of the so-called Jaish al-Mahdi special groups and that weaponry comes – continues to flow into Iraq.  There’s been a drop-off as well in explosively formed projectile attacks, but does that mean there’s been a conscious decision to stop doing that sort of thing?  There’s no way I can say that.  It could be more a case of their supplies getting interdicted or pauses for reasons that have nothing to do with policy decisions.

What I would say, in sum and being pretty modest about any ability I have to read policy thinking inside Iran is that there’s nothing out there that tells me they have made a change in aligning their practice on the ground with their policy.

QUESTION:  So why continue talking or why would they want to talk to you?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Again, I don’t expect – didn’t expect, when we first started this last year, that there would be quick results.  But I do think it’s important to make the effort and the Iraqis think it’s important to make the effort, because again, remember these are not bilateral talks.  They’re trilateral.  The Iraqis convene them.  They’re in the room.  They think it’s important to continue to try on this and I agree. 

You know, if the Iranians are, in fact, ready to come to the table in the next week or so, we’ll be laying out again what we see and I just don’t think we want to miss the opportunity to be able to have a face-to-face with them on something as important as security in Iraq.

QUESTION:  Do you expect it that soon, then?  The next week or two?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Yeah, I do, but then again, if you had asked me that in December, I would have – and did say the same thing.

QUESTION:  And it’s you who would be in this, not the – it’s not the security council or security committee working --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  The – I think it makes sense, particularly after this prolonged period when we have not had meetings, that we get our experts together first, let them put issues on the table, see where that outcome – see what comes out of that and then possibly move to the next level.

QUESTION:  But isn’t that position one reason why they balked earlier?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  You know, it’s hard to – it’s really hard to know.  I mean, we heard that they were okay with the working-level meetings and then just – communication just ceased.  I am perfectly ready to sit down with my counterpart and would expect to do so, in fact, but I do think, just looking at this from a practical standpoint, it makes more sense to have the technical-level people get together first and maybe tee up some issues for the two of us to talk about.

QUESTION:  Did they try to slip something else into these talks even though you’ve been very clear about what’s on the table and what isn’t and even make reference to the nuclear issue and that sort of thing?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Actually, you know, we set the ground rules at the beginning and we both followed them pretty closely in terms of restricting the agenda to security in Iraq.  They’ve never introduced the nuclear issue, for example, I think – and knowingly perfectly well that we’re just not going to talk about it.  But they’ve never tried.

QUESTION:  Do you take that as encouraging in any way or --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, I suppose if you’re really grasping here, that – you know, the fact that they’ve abided by the --

QUESTION:  And they showed up.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  (Laughter.)  And they showed up.  No, I think there is at least that much of a businesslike quality to this and we said we’re going to talk about security in Iraq, so that’s what we’re going to talk about.

QUESTION:  Well, this is in the context of a relationship in which the leaders of both countries basically say they don’t trust the other one as far as they could throw them.  I mean, so that’s not nothing, right?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Okay.  Anne, the record will show that you said –

(Laughter.)

QUESTION:  Well, I’m trying.  But I mean, Ahmadi-Nejad, looks like, maybe will come to Baghdad fairly soon.  Is that something that the U.S. has any view on at all as to whether that’s a good idea or now is a good time for that to happen?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  You know, Iraq has to conduct a relationship with Iran and it does.  I mean, there is travel back and forth.  For me, it’s not so much the issue of does President Ahmadi-Nejad come to Iraq; it’s what is Iran prepared to do to actually support the Iraqi Government and not create further instability that weakens it.  That’s – you know, that’s what the focus needs to be on and I think you can get distracted by starting to talk about, well, should Ahmadi-Nejad come or not come or – its focus needs to be on not who goes back and forth, but what they’re doing.  And there again, we haven’t seen a great deal that’s very encouraging.

QUESTION:  But such a visit would be pretty symbolic and it would – and an embrace on – in Baghdad of the Iranian president can’t – I mean, it’s – it would be read by many, perhaps not by you, but it would be read by many as kind of a slap in the face, no --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  When  --

QUESTION:  -- to the United States?  You know, you can talk about Iraqi sovereignty and the fact that they have to talk with their neighbors all the time, but you know, if Ahmadi-Nejad shows up and gets fanfare, you know, 21 gun salute, red carpet, this kind of thing and here’s the United States, the lowly United States that’s spent billions and billions and billions of dollars over there --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  I think it would be a real stretch to read it as anything like a slap in the face and nor am I sure it’s going to take place.  I mean, that – this has been out – this pops up every month, couple of months or so.  Look, I think the Iraqis are pretty clear-eyed on these kinds of things.  I mean, again, they have to maintain a relationship, but they are in no way oblivious to the problems that have come across that border at them.  And I think they’re going to continue to manage things in a way that tries to ensure that all of Iraq’s relations are working toward stability and not the opposite.  They’re not going to do anything to encourage further instability in Iraq.  Let me put it that way.

QUESTION:  What about Syria?  Do you see any change in the border problem there or any of the other complaints you all have had with them?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  We actually have seen a downturn in the number of suicide bombers coming across and you know, I’ve talked to my folks and to the military and we believe that is not just a – you know, a coincidence, that there is a more concerted Syrian effort to clamp down on this.  Obviously, there is still more they can and should do and I hope they will, because the kinds of people that are coming through Syria are the same kinds of people that would love to see a different regime in Damascus.  They are no friends of the Syrian Government, so again, we’ve seen some progress, would like and need to see more.

QUESTION:  Should there be a concerted U.S. effort to continue to draw Syria along that path?  I mean, there was that one Rice-Mualem meeting last year and not much since.

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, that’s the – that touches on, again, kind of the regional dynamics generally.  There will be a conference of Iraq’s neighbors, another ministerial-level conference in Kuwait at the beginning of April.  I think this is a – this is an important process to keep the focus on what the neighbors need to do to help Iraq and not hurt it.  And certainly, that includes Syria.  You know, Iraq’s problems are tough enough in their own context.  They’re a lot tougher because of the regional environment. 

You know, we’ve seen the Turkish-Kurdish problem, we talked about Iran, we talked about Syria.  Iraq’s other Arab neighbors whom I have visited and will visit again, I think clearly need to be doing more themselves to support Iraq.  I find it still fairly discouraging that there is not a single Arab ambassador resident in Baghdad.  And yet Iraq has been and will be a critical part of the Arab world.  The Arabs – there is a better security environment.  Embassies can operate with reasonable security and our Arab friends, I think, need to step forward and be present in a positive kind of way.  And again, the regional – the neighbors conference dynamic is a way to further encourage that.  So that’s going to be an important process, I think, going forward.

MR. REEKER:  That’s a good point to leave it, but we have time maybe for one more. 

QUESTION:  Do you see any – the Saudis made some intimations that they might be getting ready to when the President (inaudible) there.  Is there anyone else?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, I’ve – just in my own discussions, I had heard a willingness; first, an appreciation that things are different, that security is better, that Iraq is starting to find its feet.  Second, an acknowledgement that Iraq is a key player in the Arab world and therefore, it’s important to be engaged.  And third, an expression of intent to establish diplomatic presence.  They just need to follow through.

QUESTION:  Who?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, the Saudis and the Egyptians lead the region and I think it’s very important for them to show it in Iraq by stepping forward and putting ambassadors on the ground.  I’m getting a little lonely out there.  (Laughter.)

QUESTION:  Where’s the parties?

QUESTION:  Can I -- yeah, there’s no great parties.  Can I just ask you very quickly about PKK?

MR. REEKER:  Last one.

QUESTION:  You mentioned a moment ago that seems to have abated a bit as a real hot topic, but the Iraqis were pretty mad about it.  Are they still and what’s going to happen when it isn’t snowing anymore?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, it’s – PKK is not a new problem, but it is a problem.  I mean, they’ve – you know, after Ocalan left Syria and was arrested, they began moving into those inaccessible areas of northern Iraq.  So they’ve been there for some years now and they’ve been increasing their activities against Turkey.  It’s a problem that needs to get fixed, but again, I hate to just sound like a --

QUESTION:  Yeah, well --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  -- record that’s stuck.  It’s hard.  They’re where they are for a reason; it’s real hard to get at them.

QUESTION:  Turkey says the Iraq Government basically can’t do it and apparently, the Kurds aren’t interested in doing it, so --

AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  Well, it’s important to remember that in the '90s, the Kurds, both the KDP and the PUK, was in some pretty intensive conflict with the PKK and lost a lot of people.  They are not supporters of the PKK at all, but it’s the – it’s a question of how do you do it.  You know, the Kurds know about fighting in the mountains.  They held off Saddam’s army that way.  And their view is that there can’t be a strictly military solution to the PKK problem, that there’s got to be a political process. 

And I think that is important.  I – you know, we've got to keep pressure on these guys, they are a terrorist organization.  We say it, the Turks say it, and Iraqis say it.  But there also has to be, I think, a broader political process, certainly, between Turkey and Iraq.  I think that they’ve got to engage on how you create the conditions, the environment that increasingly limits and will eventually eliminate that PKK capacity to strike into Turkey from Iraq.  But you can’t do that, in my view, just by bombing them.  The governments have to talk and I think we can play a role there too.