Embassy News
Ambassador Ryan Crocker Interview with Michael Howard of the Guardian
February 15, 2008
QUESTION: So I'd really just like to start with, you know, the visit that was announced yesterday of President Ahmadi-Nejad and, you know, basically how relaxed are you about that, you know, in the sense that, I mean, Iraq seems to be shunned by your allies, and yet your rivals in the region are sort of embracing it.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I'm fairly relaxed. Iran and Iraq are going to have a relationship, have to have a relationship. The question is what kind is it going to be. I would be far more interested in the substance of a visit than the mere fact of it. I am not at all concerned that Ahmadi-Nejad is coming. I think we would all hope that this would be the occasion for Iran to have reassessed its long-term national security interests with respect to Iraq and be prepared to lay out a way forward that serves those interests. Because I have always believed that a stable, secure, democratic Iraq is what Iran should want over the long term, not a destabilized society with chronic security problems that Iran's actual acts on the ground now seem to be aimed at. So you know, if this visit can be the catalyst for the coherent Iranian policy that benefits Iraq's own long-term stability, then there's no reason why anyone should object to it.
But you do raise an important point. Iraq, since its establishment as a modern state, since the creation of the Arab League, has always been a major force in the Arab world. And this is clearly a time when Iraq's Arab neighbors should be paying some positive attention to developments in Iraq, how they can encourage those developments, how they can be part of an effort that helps solidify Iraq's historic position as a key player in the Arab world. And thus far, unfortunately, that kind of role, that kind of activity, has been largely absent.
QUESTION: I mean, do you think perhaps even the visit of the Iranian president might provoke them into kind of embracing Iraq a bit more?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I visited the neighbors. I made the point that as Iraq moves toward greater stability it's all the more apparent that there isn't a single resident Arab ambassador in Baghdad. There is an Iranian ambassador. I don't think the right frame for this is to suggest that Iraq should be an object of contention between Iranians and Arabs, but the Arab region has a significant interest in what happens here. And it's definitely time for them to, I think, be engaged in a positive way to see that developments serve the larger interest in a stable region.
QUESTION: You were due to have talks, security talks, with -- perhaps today, in fact. Is there any linkage between their decision to visit -- to the announcement to visit or not (inaudible) are they just -- do you think they're not -- they don't want to sort of engage you before that visit? What are your views on that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, you would need to ask them because I've long ago given up trying to parse out what the motives might be behind what the Iranians do or don't do. We have tried to be clear from the outset of this discussion that the reason we're prepared to sit down with the Iranians is because of our overriding interest in security in Iraq. That's the issue. How can security be further improved here?
We have left out all other issues, which is why we've been saying since the Iraqis first came to us back in December that we're ready to talk. We were ready to talk then. We were ready to talk in January. We were ready to talk in February, including today. It's the Iranians who keep finding reasons not to show up. So what's behind their latest delay, again, ask them. It's unfortunate in my view because we do have a specific agenda, it is about security in Iraq. That is certainly important to us. It should be important to them, too.
QUESTION: I mean, is -- I mean, do you feel that you've got -- you know, the previous rounds of talks that you've had, do you feel that they've had some success? I mean, do you -- in terms of their input on security? I mean, I think somebody -- one of the top generals yesterday was sort of saying Iran was still -- seems to be supporting some of these special groups and sending in EFPs.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It's very hard for me to point to developments on the ground and say that they reflect a positive policy change in Tehran. I just don't really see that. The rate of IED and EFP attacks varies. We see spikes. We see declines. It's just not possible for me to say that the decline, when we see it, is the result of a policy decision in Tehran. There are too many other factors out there.
But we do know that Iranian support for the special groups and other extremist violent elements continues. The training continues. The flow of weapons and munitions continue. Have you been down to Basra this trip yet?
QUESTION: Not recently, no.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I went down there a few weeks ago, and really, everyone one talks to down there complains about Iranian involvement and negative interference, again, in support of extremist militias. So it's clearly going on. We do have the phenomenon of the Muqtada al-Sadr ceasefire. Again, I'm unable to say whether the Iranians brought any influence to bear there. If they did, it would be a good thing, obviously. But it's just not a determination that I can make.
QUESTION: Sure, sure. I mean, on that last point, what are your indications about this ceasefire by the Sadrists? Do you expect it to be renewed? Sort of, you know, if it is renewed, is that going to be calamitous for security?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, we certainly hope it will be extended. It is important to remember the circumstances that proceeded the original announcement. The attacks around the shrines in Karbala during the Shabaniya in August that led to such a widespread negative popular reaction among Iraqi Shia. I think that the ceasefire, although imperfectly observed, clearly has been a positive development.
And I would also hope the Sadr trend also finds itself that the people of Iraq broadly -- Shia as well as Sunnis -- are making it clear that they're tired of violence. That's what the Sunnis did in Anbar and Baghdad and other areas. Iraq's Shia are effectively saying the same thing in the south, so that an extended ceasefire becomes good politics. Because we certainly accept that the Sadr trend has a political role to play in Iraq. They, I think, have a weight in Iraqi politics. They have since, say, Mohammed Saddaq al-Sadr developed the trend in the '90s. The critical question is how is that role going to be played, and I think increasingly the trend, the desire of the Iraqi people, is to see that politics are politics, not simply a means of extending violence.
QUESTION: If I can sort of switch to the other side, Syria. We had some statements, a renewal of sanctions or an extension of sanctions against Syria this week, in part justified by their continued sort of activities in Iraq. We also had the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh. And you know, a few weeks ago, you know, there were American diplomats who were saying, you know, well, Syria is being quite cooperative in helping to reduce the flow of insurgents across the border. Has anything happened recently to make you question it? And was there any involvement of this guy who was killed in Iraq, to your knowledge, in Mughniyeh?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, with respect to Syria's actions, I think what we have said is that we have seen a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters through Syria. Obviously, that's something that we welcome. But we certainly have not seen anything that I could describe as a concerted Syrian effort to shut this down completely. A flow continues and I think we have to consider that it continues with a degree of Syrian complicity. The steps that we've announced are intended to push the Syrians toward more comprehensive action to shut this off.
Just as we discussed a bit with respect to Iran, it's in a sense an effort to get the Syrians to look at their own long-term interests. The elements whose travel they facilitate through Syria are also elements that, given the opportunity, would like very much to take on the Syrian regime as their fellow ideologues have done or have attempted to do at various times since the early '80s, late '70s. These are not the natural allies of the Syrian regime, and it would be good if Damascus conducted its behavior in a way consistent really with its own long-term interests. And that's what our effort is aimed at.
With respect to Imad Mughniyeh, you know, one of the worst of the worst, clearly, since his involvement of the bombings of the Embassy and the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, through the next quarter of a century. I do not have specific information that would link Mughniyeh to events inside Iraq, but we have established that Lebanese Hezbollah via Iran has been involved in, for example, training of Iraqi operatives. The common link throughout all of that in Lebanon, here, elsewhere in the region, has been Iran, and in particular the IRGC Quds Force.
QUESTION: I mean, you know, Damascus has got quite a lot of sort of -- I mean, historically, it always seem to have even been a host to the Iraqi opposition. When Saddam was there, you know, the Kurds, and the current sort of Shia government, where there now seem to be a lot of, you know, Sunni groups there. You know, are you pressuring Damascus over the presence of those groups? I mean, and what influence do you think they have on the Sunni side here, and are you talking to them?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, again, as Iraq develops, it is in Iraq's interest and in the interests of its neighbors that those neighbors take a long look at both how events are moving here and where their own long-term interests lie. There are persistent reports of the Syrians harboring elements of the former Iraqi Baath regime inside Syria. That is not good for Iraq and I would suggest also not good for Syria. This was a regime under Saddam that did its level best to try to subvert the Syrian Baathi regime. There was a time in which car bombs were going off fairly regularly in Damascus that were designed and ordered out of here and in which individuals like Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri clearly had a role -- the same Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri that is widely said to be harbored now in Damascus.
So not that it's possible, but how could Syria think it's in its interest to support a restoration of a regime that attempted to bring down their own regime? These are elements that are part of very bad history in Iraq, in the region and for Syria, and the Syrians, again, need to look at how they can support the development of a stable Iraq, a stable and secure Iraq that will never again threaten any of its neighbors. That's the common threat that should unite the neighborhood -- Iran, Syria, the other Arabs. And through the mechanism of regional conference, conferences and working groups, I continue to hope that that will be the case.
QUESTION: But I mean, the specific groups that are in Damascus, for example, for now they appear to have accepted, or you know, whether it's a choice or because they have no option, that, you know, sort of anti-al-Qaida stance of, you know, Sunnis certainly in western Iraq. I mean, have you been -- talked to them about that or, you know, what level of discussion is going on? I mean, for example, my newspaper interviewed some of the so-called resistance leaders in Damascus, and they said, you know, we're -- we are -- you know, we're against al-Qaida, you know, but we're also against the occupation, et cetera, so we will sit out, we will get rid of al-Qaida and then we will continue our resistance. I mean, is that how you see the picture?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, as events and conditions have led to a marked improvement particularly in the west in Anbar, I think figures like these begin to lose their significance and their relevance. What we're seeing now is that the action, the political action, is clearly inside of Iraq, and a number of the tribal figures have returned to Iraq from Syria, Jordan and elsewhere because they can now play a role. Those who remain outside, again, I think are going to find that they are simply less and less relevant.
The new Iraq has shown itself able to accommodate a very wide range indeed of political views. One can have all sorts of issues with the current government. The critical thing how is for there to be an acceptance that those views can now be expressed inside Iraq and through peaceful means.
Now that the provincial powers act has passed, a date has been set for elections, for example -- October 1st for provincial elections. This to me would seem to be the time for those who care about this country, including Iraqis abroad, it's time to come back and to get into the political mix because those elections will establish the provincial governments for the future.
QUESTION: Yeah, which are, of course, crucial to federalism, et cetera.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Exactly.
QUESTION: Yeah, yeah. I mean, on the -- you know, you're coming up to five years now since the invasion and, you know, you're also about to start strategic agreement talks and I sort of read the Rice and Gates sort of op-ed this week, et cetera. Could you just tell me a bit about, you know, what you're hoping to achieve with that and, you know, whether it's going to deal with some very sensitive issues as far as the Iraqis go in terms of, say, the status of foreign private security contractors here or, you know, whether the U.S. will still be able to detain people, for example. I mean, these will be up for discussion and not -- you know, things like that rather than troop numbers, the specific troop numbers and timelines.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, broadly speaking, the strategic framework agreement that we will begin negotiating shortly will do a number of things. First, it will supersede the current Security Council resolution that has been the basis for multinational force operation since Iraq's independence. And the Iraqis have made clear and we have agreed that 2008 is the last year that Iraq should be under a Chapter 7 resolution.
So this agreement must set the conditions for our presence beyond 2008. But even more than that, it is a means to organize our relations in the security field and other fields on the basis of understandings between two sovereign nations; that Iraq will through this agreement, I think, fully establish that it is back on the international stage as a fully sovereign state dealing on terms of equality with all other nations.
Now, the full agenda for talks, we're still working out positions, as are the Iraqis, so I'm clearly not in a position to open negotiations through the media. But again, when you look at the Security Council resolution, it's obvious that we're going to have to find a way to look to capture those authorities in -- perhaps not at all in the same form but in a bilateral agreement as we go forward. Because for all of the successes that the Iraqis and we have registered against enemies such as al-Qaida, and they have been considerable, I think it's also clear as we sit here in February of 2008 that this is a determined, tenacious enemy that's still going to be out there at the end of the year. And we and the Iraqis are going to have to have the abilities to ensure that we are able to continue this campaign until it is ultimately and finally eliminated.
QUESTION: The debate in the U.S. sort of presidential nomination race at the moment, you know, Senator Obama is saying we'll bring -- if he's president, we'll bring the troops home within 16 months, and Hillary is saying she'll begin withdrawing immediately. I don't know if you're able to answer this without getting yourself into hot water, but I mean, you know, is that actually possible? It is physically possible to bring all the troops home within 16 months, I mean, and all the transferring that's -- I mean, I read somewhere it would take two -- at least two years to do that.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, a couple of points. First, of course, the troops are already going home. A redeployment is underway and, as you know, by July of 2008 the surge elements will be out of Iraq. I think looking beyond that, whether for the remainder of this administration or into the new administration, it's very important to keep in mind the principle that has motivated us here, which has withdrawals, redeployments, based on conditions. These are conditions very carefully evaluated by us, by the Iraqis, and it is on that basis that we decide that we can afford to back out forces without risking the gains that have been achieved.
There are, of course, other ways to do this: simply forget about conditions and set up a timetable and march to the timetable. But I think anyone contemplating that course of action should contemplate very seriously what the consequences could be. Over the last year, we and the Iraqis have achieved a great deal here and we've paid a high price for it, Certainly in my view sitting here in Baghdad, it would be extremely risky to gamble on those gains by moving away from conditions-based redeployments.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. REEKER: We'll have to wrap it up.
QUESTION: Can I just have one last one? The -- it's just really to do with, you know, the very critical memo that's been sort of leaked and basically suggesting that the State Department or, you know, here was not really sort of kitted out to do nation-building. That was one general sort of theme. I mean, would you accept some of those criticisms that were in that report or in that memo?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, those were the personal views of one individual who was out here and didn't have his contract renewed. I'd say in general, you know, first that the phase we are in now, it is the Iraqis who are building their nation. And that's as it must be. We are assisting through fairly extensive programs in that process, and during my time here, just about a year now, we've gone through some fairly extensive reorganizations and staffing increases to ensure that we're best prepared to be able to do that. And that's brought a lot of additional people into this. We've increased our provincial reconstruction teams from 10 this time last year to 24 today, all over the country. And those have been very successful in helping build provincial capacity. And here in Baghdad, we brought out a number of senior State Department officers to take on various aspects of our programs in support of the Iraqis here.
I think we're doing pretty well at this. We have to stay flexible and stay agile, because as conditions change, new opportunities arise, and things you could not do before you can do now. And we have to be able to move to take advantage of that; for example, bringing out a number of additional individuals to provide assistance to the Ministry of Health because the Minister has asked for it and because conditions in that ministry now permit us to work effectively. So again, I think we're in a pretty good position right now to support the Iraqis, but it's something that's constantly evolving and we have to stay flexible to respond to it.
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