2008 Press Releases
Press Conference with Ambassador David M. Satterfield
June 10, 2008
SPEAKER: We are very pleased to have with us today the senior advisor and coordinator for Iraq, Ambassador David Satterfield.
We thought we would arrange for this briefing simply because there has been a lot in the press lately about status-of-forces agreement negotiations going on, a lot of questions, a lot of confusion. And our hope is that Ambassador Satterfield can help clarify some of that confusion, as opposed to create more confusion.
So, anyway, that is what he is here for today, to basically respond to your questions and have a discussion about this issue. Or, if there are other issues you are interested in, I am sure he is capable of answering those, as well. But, anyway, that was the focus. We are very pleased to have Ambassador Satterfield with us. Thank you.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thanks. We will start with your questions.
MS. GARCIA-NAVARRO: Lourdes Garcia-Navarro from National Public Radio. How are you, Sir?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: How are you doing?
MS. GARCIA-NAVARRO: How are you? A couple of things. If you could, speak to us in detail about exactly what it is that has been put on the table. We have heard -- I can go through what I have heard from my Iraqi sources about it. I would rather not have to, but I can, in order to get you to, in detail, tell us exactly what it is that the United States is offering for the SOFA, in particular.
We have heard 58 bases, we have heard 29,000-feet air space, we have heard a lot of different things, and I would really like to get some clarification on the American position here.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Sure. Well, Lourdes, there is a lot of talk coming both from within this country and from outside the country -- far too much talk, in fact, which is not based on the reality of what has been, or is being discussed in these negotiations.
I am not going to go into detail on the specific content of these discussions. But what I will talk about is this. The United States' approach has been based upon the concept of partnership. Iraq is a sovereign nation, is our partner in these negotiations. The substance, the content of what we are talking about, in terms of the strategic relationship we are seeking to build, whether through the strategic framework agreement, the status-of-forces agreement, all the parts that we are putting together, working on putting together with our Iraqi colleagues, they are all based upon one fundamental premise, one fundamental principle: the complete respect for, acknowledgment of Iraqi sovereignty, and an Iraqi national decision.
They are not a negotiation based upon pressure. They are not negotiations based upon a dictate by the United States. There are no demands in these negotiations. They are discussions designed to produce a meaningful partnership that has a security dimension which is itself intended, as it has always been intended, to help strengthen Iraq, the government of Iraq, the armed forces of Iraq, to allow Iraq to be able, ultimately, to provide for its own defense, to provide for its own security.
We will do nothing in these negotiations that in any way could harm, could weaken the Iraqi government. We will do nothing in these negotiations that is not ultimately fully transparent.
The government of Iraq has stated from the beginning that it intends to submit the results of these negotiations, the strategic agreement that we come to, to the Iraqi people through the Iraqi Council of Representatives. And we have based our own negotiating posture upon that knowledge. This is, will be, a fully transparent process when complete, with respect to a decision, not just by the government of Iraq, but also by the Council of Representatives of Iraq, the representatives of the Iraqi people.
We want, as a goal of these negotiations, to seek Iraqi sovereignty strengthened, not weakened. We would hope all states, including those who have been commenting extensively on these negotiations, would also respect Iraq's sovereignty. The United States does not believe that Iraq should be an arena for a platform for attacks on other states. That is our principle. But other states must also respect Iraq's sovereignty, and not make of Iraq a forum for their conflicts, whether with respect to us, the United States, or others.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) Mr. Ambassador, you talked about two important things: transparency and sovereignty. In regards to transparency, until so far, no media or press has ever seen what is going on in the negotiations. We do not know the nature of this draft or the first or the second draft that was presented yesterday.
In regards to sovereignty, yesterday, more than one official from different blocks have expressed resentment about the first draft and said that it is –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: With respect to transparency, I said in my opening remarks that the product of these negotiations, ultimately, will be submitted to the Iraqi council of representatives, through them to the Iraqi people.
But these are negotiations. No negotiations that I am aware of, or I have ever been involved in in 30 years have been conducted in the public eye. They are conducted between the parties, the state parties directly involved. That is not unusual. In fact, it would be quite unusual to do these in any different fashion. Transparency relates to how these agreements -- how this agreement -- will ultimately be submitted to the Iraqi people. The government must defend this agreement in front of the people. We understand that. And so, the content, the phrasing, the character of this agreement will be one at the end which we very much hope is defensible by the Iraqi government.
With regard to whether or not portions of the negotiating process -- submittals, particular proposals that had been advanced -- were or were not rejected by the Iraqi side on the basis of challenges to Iraqi sovereignty, I will repeat my first point. The fundamental principle of where we are in these negotiations -- the United States -- is acknowledgment of respect for Iraq's sovereignty, and a desire to do nothing which could be interpreted as harming or affecting that sovereignty.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) There are some parties in Iraq, they are saying that the U.S. is acquiring (inaudible) from Iraq in return for a strategic agreement. Would you support this demand from the Iraq side?
And what is the future of $50 billion in American banks from Iraqi funds if this agreement will not go forward?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: We have seen a number of comments in the press regarding the issues which you just raised, and the comments are completely misguided, mistaken. They have no basis in fact, whatsoever.
With respect to why we are doing these negotiations at all, the government of Iraq, last year, made clear to the United States government in the course of our negotiations last November of the Declaration of Principles -- the declaration which shapes overall and which serves as sort of a policy chapeau to what we are doing today -- the government of Iraq made clear to us -- then, in December, made clear to the United Nations Security Council -- that it was the desire of the Iraqi government, Iraq's political leaders, to see the Chapter 7 mandate enshrined in what became Resolution 1790 that expires December 31st of this year, that that mandate that established and sustains the multi-national force Iraq come to a close no later than December 31st of this year.
The government of Iraq requested that a bilateral arrangement, a bilateral agreement between Iraq and the United States -- and potentially between Iraq and other coalition partners -- be the new basis for the presence of our, and potentially other, forces in this country and the operation and status of those forces. That is why we are doing this. It is in response to a specific Iraqi request conveyed on a bilateral basis to my government, as well as on a multi-national basis through the United National Security Council, effectively to the world.
We very much hope -- and the whole purpose of these negotiations -- is to establish that bilateral sovereign-state-to-sovereign-state basis for the presence of our forces here, and for their actions in support of the government of Iraq and the security forces of Iraq. If we are successful in these negotiations -- and I have every hope that we will be -- then this will replace this new agreement, the international mandate provided through the Chapter 7 Resolution 1790. That's why we are doing this. That is our goal.
With respect to the $50 billion that you referred to, there is absolutely no invocation by the U.S. in any way implicit, explicit, direct, or indirect, of the status of any funds which may reside within the U.S. banking system, the U.S. Federal Reserve system, and these negotiations. They are completely unconnected. And I really can only tell you any accounts or any reportage that claims that we have in any way linked these two issues is completely mistaken, completely misguided.
There is a genuine issue which the Iraqi government has raised, over how best to protect its assets, internationally, from potential claims. That's a very valid issue. It's an issue which we are exploring with the government of Iraq. The government of Iraq is looking at -- within itself to decide what's the best course to provide necessary guarantees, assurances, or protections for its assets.
In the United States, with respect to U.S. claims, U.S. law, the President has acted up to the bounds of his legal and Constitutional authority to provide those protections, and has done so in quite extraordinary fashion. The Iraqi concern is focused on international, potential international, claims outside the U.S. But that is not linked in any sense of leverage to these negotiations. I really cannot be more clear about that with you.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) Mr. Ambassador, this Iranian party has obvious concerns, and I guess they just claim that the security agreement -- everyone knows that Iran has nuclear plants. If any conflict, U.S./Iranian conflict happens, would the security agreement – is it a way to strike Iran?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: The only comment I would have on this or other remarks that have been made by Iranian officials, either prior to the prime minister's trip, or in the context of the prime minister's trip, is that the United States is negotiating this agreement with the government of Iraq, with the political leaders of Iraq represented by the executive council and their deputies. We are not negotiating this agreement - nor has the government of Iraq in any suggested that it would be appropriate to negotiate this agreement with - any foreign state, including the government of Iran.
The government of Iraq has made very clear to us in the course of these negotiations -- and I think by its own statements has made very clear -- this is a bilateral process designed, at the end, to advance and serve fundamental Iraqi national interests, interests of the Iraqi people, as well, of course, as interests that we believe are important to the United States.
And I would leave the question you posed to me to the Iraqi government and the Iranian government for specific comment. We are moving ahead with our negotiations with the government of Iraq, as the government of Iraq is moving ahead with these negotiations with our side.
MR. PARKER: Thanks. Ned Parker, with the "Los Angeles Times." There was, I believe, a report on AP that moved late last night, talking from Washington, quoting an administration official, saying there was a good chance, or mentioning the possibility that the negotiations for this agreement might not be completed this year by the time the UN mandate expires.
What are options on the table, in case negotiations are dragging on, it's October, and you haven't, you know, reached an agreement?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Sure. Now, this is an on-the-record briefing. You can quote me by name. I am, at present, the leader of these negotiations. I believe the unnamed senior U.S. official quoted in that report that you reference claimed to be close to the talks. I will speak authoritatively on this issue.
We are proceeding on a course intended to see a bilateral arrangement between the United States government and the government of Iraq replace the international mandate, the Chapter 7 mandate, provided in Resolution 1790. That is the Iraqi goal, that is our goal. It is enshrined in the President's signed declaration of principles with Prime Minister Maliki.
We have every confidence that that goal can be achieved, and can be achieved by the end-of-July deadline with -- both sides believe it is important to work towards. That is our policy. That is what these negotiations are based upon. And because we believe this goal of negotiating a new bilateral arrangement to replace the international mandate is achievable, is doable, that's where our focus is, not on potential alternatives, plans B, C, or D.
MR. PARKER: But they must (inaudible) to a point. I mean, granted, you want to achieve this goal. Hopefully you will. But there is a possibility that it might not happen.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yes, we are –
MR. PARKER: So there must be some broad ideas –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: We are focused on plan A, because we believe plan A can succeed. And that's where the Iraqis are, as well.
MR. PARKER: Okay, all right. Thanks.
MODERATOR: Going back over here.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) This agreement can be revised? Is this including all articles and chapters of the agreement? What is the importance of the date, December (sic) 31st –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I'm sorry, I'm not sure I follow that question.
QUESTION: What's the importance of the July 31st –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Oh, 31st, I thought it was the 21st. No, I'm sorry. Both of the sides -- I will answer your second question first. Both the sides here, Iraqi and U.S., believe it is important to set a goal for conclusion of these negotiations. End of July, as the ultimate termination point, was seen by both of us as a useful focal point.
We still think it's an achievable goal. These are negotiations that began, in effect, last November with the conclusion of the declaration of principles, December, with the Iraqi letter to the security council requesting the extension for a final year of the security council resolution providing for the MNFI. It is always best in a negotiation to work on a time line. And this time line concludes at the end of July.
Your question may be, "Well, what if you aren't finished by then?" We believe this is doable by the end of July. So does the Iraqi side.
And with respect to the first part of your question, look. We -- both of us, the Iraqi government, Iraqi political leadership, my government -- are committed to making this partnership and the agreement that enshrines this partnership, which has dimensions beyond security -- a lot of focus has been made here on the security dimension of our relationship. There are other dimensions: social, economic, technical, cultural, scientific, political. We are focused on all of those dimensions. We have made very considerable progress in reaching closure on how best to describe how this partnership will move ahead.
There are outstanding issues, obviously, including issues focused on the security side. But we are absolutely convinced a successful way through can be found, that we can reach a successful conclusion to these talks, and can do so within the weeks or the month-and-a-half to come.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) Mr. Ambassador, you said that you will guarantee that the sovereignty of Iraq will not be violated in any way. The first draft on this agreement had some objections from the Iraqi side. Did you work on the -- those concerns –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: This is a negotiation process. It has gone on now for some two months. In any negotiation, presentations are made by one side, responded to by the other side. Counter-proposals are made. This is the way negotiations work.
From the beginning of this process, the U.S. side made clear -- frankly, as did the Iraq side -- that flexibility would be required in these discussions, so long as the fundamental goal – the end point, the end state -- remained clear to both. And the negotiations, the course of the negotiations, has certainly reflected that.
I don't think it is unusual for either side in a negotiation to adjust positions, for either side in a negotiation to clarify, as talks go on, about what is needed, what may not be needed, what course to follow, what alternate course may be available. And that is exactly what has been happening here.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) They talk now on negotiations, but it is not clear what is the time period about this partnership that you have referred to. Earlier, you said there is a security side -- focus on that security. What is the benefit in the economic or political or social benefits for the Iraqi people? And I wish the answer to be in Arabic.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, I am going to answer in English, but the answer to your first question, time limits. As we contemplated, the strategic framework would not be limited in the time that it is valid. It is very unusual for these kinds of arrangements to have a time limitation. Obviously, either side -- and there will be a provision to this effect -- either side will be able to provide notice of termination or cancellation of the arrangement. That is a conventional part of virtually any international agreement of this kind.
With respect to other portions of this agreement, the package, including on security issues, it is typical that either there is a provision that says, "After a period of time upon -- this agreement will be reviewed." For instance, after one year, two years, six months, the agreement shall be subject to review. Or, another familiar phrasing is, "Upon notification by any one side after a year," after six months, after some period of time, "the agreement can be terminated." And I would be sure that, for this agreement, one or another provision along those lines will be included.
With respect to the benefit to the Iraqi people of the non-security aspects of the agreement, the strategic framework agreement, obviously, as the government of Iraq made clear in the remarks by the Prime Minister, Bayan Jabr, Barham Saleh, in Stockholm to the international community a very little while ago at the international compact meeting, Iraq needs technical assistance, support from the international community, as well as from its neighbors.
To the extent that this Strategic Framework Agreement that we are negotiating with Iraq can help better to facilitate the kind of provision of assistance, advice, investment, participation by the private as well as public sector that Iraq is looking for and needs, it's a step forward.
To the extent this agreement helps other states come to similar agreements with Iraq for the provision of their own assistance, that is a positive thing, as well.
But I would walk you back for a moment from these very specific focuses -- what will this agreement and that provision do -- to a much broader principle, which I think is of tremendous value to the Iraqi people. Iraq's status and stature as a normal state, a state with institutions, with a functional government, with security services, who, despite the obvious and significant challenges, are making progress, progress in building a state out of what had come before, an agreement of this kind, sovereign state to sovereign state, the ending of the international MNFI mandate, that represents a very important step forward, not just symbolically, but in a concrete fashion, as Iraq moves forward to take its place on the regional stage and the world stage.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) Mr. Ambassador, if Washington and Baghdad reach an agreement, do you think this agreement will be binding for the new administration?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: This agreement will be an executive agreement conducted between our two governments. As such, it is a legal agreement, an international agreement between the two parties. We have made very clear -- the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense -- that we cannot, we will not, seek to bind the next administration.
But we believe the fundamental U.S. interests, the fundamental U.S. goals, the fundamental Iraqi interests and goals, which are enshrined in this partnership, in the security aspects of this partnership, will be goals which will be seen as important, as significant, and as important to sustain by future administrations.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) Mr. Ambassador, do you think there are any Iranian pressures on the Shiite block, ruling block, in Iraq to stop this agreement? And is there an intention to continue negotiations with Iran?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Your first question, that should really be referred to the Iraqi government for their comment.
I said, in response to an earlier question, that these negotiations are ongoing, they have not stopped. We have, just last night, had another round of discussions with our Iraqi counterparts. They are proceeding with these negotiations in the spirit of coming to a mutually agreeable conclusion. And that is what we are focused on, not reports or allegation of pressures from outside.
I would say again I think it's important that parties outside Iraq who are calling for respect of Iraq's sovereignty be very sure that they, themselves, are fully respecting that sovereignty, that they, themselves, are fully respecting, as we do, as the United States does, that Iraq, and Iraq alone, has the decision within its boundaries.
On the second part of your question, we do not take off the table the potential to have another discussion with Iran in the presence of the Iraqi government here in Baghdad on issues concerning Iraq. There is no plan for such a meeting. The principle, this channel is one that we have not closed, and will not close. But it is important that we know that such talks are likely to be productive and successful before they are scheduled.
MS. CHON: Gina Chon, "Wall Street Journal." In terms of the issue of Iraqi sovereignty, some of the issues that are coming up in these discussions are not exactly new, like in terms of jurisdiction over security contractors, that sort of thing.
Just given outside the specifics, because I know you don't want to comment on the specific points, but just given outside of that, what is your comment on just national sovereignty, in terms of trying to balance Iraqi interests, as well as U.S. interests? Because there is definitely resistance on the U.S. side to hand over certain aspects to the Iraqi government.
And then, my second question, just as a procedural matter, what happens if the Iraqi parliament rejects the agreement? What's the next step after that, if that happens?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, Gina, again -- and asking you to respect the fact that I am not going to be commenting on either Iraqi positions or U.S. positions in the negotiations themselves -- we do respect Iraqi sovereignty. This will not be the first time that the United States has negotiated an agreement with a foreign state that prizes its sovereignty very highly. Virtually all, if not every one, of our 80-plus partners around the world with whom we have status-of-forces agreements have very high regard for their national sovereignty. Iraq is not unique in that respect.
There are excellent examples around the world of how this balancing, as you described it, between fundamental U.S. goals and also requirements -- because there are certain requirements that are not unique to Iraq, they are common around the world where our forces are present -- how those requirements can be met and acknowledged, but at the same time, in a manner that is respectful of the sovereignty of the state in which our forces are present.
We have decades, a half-century-plus, of experience, practical experience on this. The Iraqi government has just sent -- indeed, the team just returned -- a delegation that went to Germany, to Japan, to Korea, and to Turkey with the express purpose of examining how, over the years, U.S. status-of-forces agreements with these different countries have worked, have been changed, how, in practice, they unfold on the ground. And I think it was a very useful discussion for that Iraqi team to have had, and we certainly hope that it shapes the direction of these negotiations.
As to your second question, we are negotiating, and have been negotiating, this agreement with a team made up of representatives of the Iraqi executive council -- it used to be called the Group of Five, the five senior political leaders. They represent a diverse range of the senior political leadership represented in the council of representatives. The decision to proceed or not to proceed with any part of this agreement, or with the agreement as a whole, is going to be made collectively by the executive council.
We did this, and the Iraqi side set up this structure deliberately, so that this would not be an agreement negotiated with one faction, one leader, one office, but rather with Iraq's political leadership as a whole.
We are very confident, as are our colleagues, that if indeed an agreement can be reached as a result of this national delegation and national decision, that that is an agreement which can successfully move through the council of representatives.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) You have said this agreement, if it was reached, there will be benefits for Iraq in security, socially, and economically. What are the benefits for the American side from this agreement?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: We believe -- and this will not be a new message to any of you who have heard us speak over the years -- we believe fundamentally that a secure, stable, self-reliant Iraq -- self-reliant in terms of security, self-reliant in terms of economics -- is an asset for the region, for the international community, and certainly for the United States, not just as an ally in the war against terror, but also as a positive force in the economy, the politics, and the overall stability of this region.
That is the benefit for the United States people. That is why the extraordinary sacrifice that we, our coalition partners, and above all, the Iraqi people and Iraqi security forces have made and continue to make is, in our view, worthwhile from a historic sense, from the sense of the long-term gains to all of us, to this region as a whole, and the international community of the success of the new Iraq.
QUESTION: I just want to go back to the July 31st deadline one more time. Almost every Iraqi official that I have spoken to has expressed an interest in having more time, including the government spokesmen, saying that they don't want to agree to something that will, in the end, become "another occupation," in their words.
And I wanted to ask where you have the impression that they wouldn't want more time. I mean, everybody I have spoken to says they would like extra time, even if it includes renewing the mandate. Is that something that the United States is amenable to?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: The Iraqi negotiating team, the Iraqi political leadership who empower that negotiating team, have been working with us and continue to affirm the potential do-ability of this negotiation by the end of July. And we believe, as they do, that holding to this goal is very important.
At the end of the day, this is a negotiation. And coming up with the right result to this negotiation is the ultimate objective of both sides. But we believe that right result can be done by the end of July. So, why would we think this is doable by July? Because the Iraqis actually engaged in the negotiations believe it can be done by the end of July.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) My first question is, do you believe, by reaching this agreement, that Iraq would be in a state of U.S./Iranian war in the future?
My second question, is there anything that binding the U.S. administration or U.S. Army to leave Iraq 100 percent?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I will take the first part of your question, because I have answered that in several other comments that I have made. We don't believe this agreement -- we don't believe the presence of our forces here, aiding Iraq's security forces and the Iraqi government in establishing the rule of law in this country, in establishing security for Iraq within its borders, is a threat to any state, to any state, including Iran.
If your question is, will the Iranian government choose to use this as a justification for hostile actions inside Iraq, that is a question best addressed to the Iranian government. My government certainly believes no state should feel threatened by this agreement, and that is the view of the Iraqi government, I believe, as well.
With respect to your second question, U.S. forces are present in the country now, and would be present in the country after the signature of this agreement to provide assistance to the Iraqi government, to Iraqi security forces, in developing their capacities, or continuing to develop their capacities to provide for Iraq's own security, establishment of the rule of law, and Iraq's defense.
We see our participation in that process, whether it is in the form of the combat operations undertaken by our forces, or other supportive arrangements, as on a time curve. That is to say, there is a horizon here. As Iraq's forces become more capable, as the security situation improves the need for U.S. forces, for coalition or other foreign forces, to engage in support will diminish. We have seen that happen inside Iraq and other areas. This is obviously the direction we want to proceed in.
We are not 100 percent responsible today for Iraq's security. Iraq is 100 percent responsible for its security. We provide assistance. The character of that assistance will certainly change shape, change form, diminish as time goes and as Iraq's forces stand up.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) Mr. Ambassador, can you tell us about who decided the deadline for the negotiations, and in which country will the agreement be signed?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Both the sides believe working towards this end-of-July date is appropriate. Again, negotiations need to have a sense of timeliness to provide some sense of urgency and speed. We think this is appropriate. The government of Iraq has been working with us on this.
And with respect to your second question, that has yet to be determined.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) I wanted to see about your point about transparency. You talked about both delegations, the U.S. delegation headed by whom, and who is heading the Iraqi delegation?
And is it true that the agreement is including chapters such as the mail services for Americans and flying over Iraqi bases?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I am not going to go into details of the content of this negotiation. The negotiations are headed on the American side by Ambassador Crocker. They are headed on the Iraqi side by Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih at the level of the deputies who conduct the negotiations on the strategic framework. Ultimately, they are under the authority of the Executive Council, the Iraqi side.
QUESTION: One thing I was curious about in talking with various Iraqi politicians, a subject that does come up to a point is Blackwater. You know, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi's bodyguard was shot by a body –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yes.
QUESTION: -- by a member of Blackwater, and then he was taken out of the country, and is living freely in Seattle. And, of course, other incidents.
How has Blackwater, just judging from talking with politicians, how has that affected or impacted negotiations regarding this concern about sovereignty?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Without going into detail of the specifics of these negotiations, certainly. The issue of contractors, including security contractors, is a sensitive one. It is a significant one, not only for the Iraqi government, but also for the members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. How this issue is ultimately managed in the context of the overall discussions we are having with the Iraqi government will be the object of, and continues to be the object of, negotiations. But, yes, it is a sensitive issue. It is an important issue, and we fully recognize it as such.
QUESTION: (via interpreter) Full transparency. If you were an Iraqi negotiator, would you agree to the draft?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: In that we are not discussing at this point what those specific proposals were or are, I am really not in a position to place myself in the position of an Iraqi negotiator.
We are not going to negotiate this agreement either in public, with the press, or in the political arena outside these talks. It will be based, though, the negotiation, on full respect for Iraqi sovereignty. And I assure you we understand full well the Iraqi side will not conclude an arrangement that they cannot present to their people and to their parliament as an agreement that respects -- indeed, strengthens -- Iraq sovereignty.
MS. GOOTMAN: Elissa Gootman at the "New York Times." Can you explain why this is not a treaty, or why this would not have to be voted on similarly by the American -- or by the Senate, as it is by the council of representatives?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Sure.
MS. GOOTMAN: And –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Yes. You have really asked two questions. The first question is whether or not an international agreement is or is not presented to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent, for a vote.
It depends on the content of that agreement. There is well-established precedent that sets, over time -- or that has set, over time -- where the boundaries are, in terms of binding U.S. commitments and not. This agreement, its provisions, its terms, falls, in our view, squarely in the category of an executive agreement. It does not contain the kind of specific provisions which would trigger Senate advice and consent.
Your second question, though, there is a complete disassociation in U.S. law between the Constitutional, or legal practices of a foreign state, with respect to their treatment of an international agreement with the U.S. and the practices which the U.S. applies. Many foreign States have very different legal or constitutional procedures for such agreements than the U.S. does. They must honor their rules. We honor ours. The two don't cross.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We appreciate it.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you all.
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