2007 Press Releases
Remarks by Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker during his Media Roundtable with Western Journalist
December 23, 2007
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Thanks, Phil. And good afternoon to all of you. I was reminded today again of what it means to report the news from Iraq since Iraq has been designated, to no one's great surprise, the most dangerous place in the world to cover the news from for the fifth year running. Thanks for being here and thanks for doing what you're doing.
I'll make just a couple of brief comments. Pretty clearly, 2007 ends in Iraq in a substantially better place than where it began. The obvious -- most obvious difference, clearly, the reduction in the levels of violence over the last couple of months. The surge -- and it is, of course, a combined surge, Iraqi and coalition -- has had its impact. And that process, of course, in the course of the year brought about some developments that were not entirely foreseen and good for a change. The Anbar Awakening and its movement in different forms through different parts of the country as the surge moved forward, the readiness of Iraqis who had previously been on the fence or actively part of the resistance, taking sides with their own forces and with ours -- again, all good news. The improving capacity of the government to function as a government, particularly in the economic field -- budget formulation, budget execution, both centrally and in the provinces substantially better.
I think we've been particularly struck by the ability of provincial governments now to develop a budgeting and budget execution capacity. Provincial government, as you know, is completely a new phenomenon in post-2003 Iraq. Like so many other things, there was no template to work from. This is creation as they move along. And as I have been around the provinces, I've been impressed greatly by what they've been able to do in a relatively short period of time.
We've seen recently positive developments with respect to Article 140, consensus on moving the timelines out to the right and involving the United Nations in a technical capacity. And I'd say that that's another element of the positive news at the end of the year, a more active, more robust United Nations. They've plussed-up staff, and I expect as we move into the new year we're going to see more and more constructive activity out of UNAMI.
As we look ahead into 2008, this is going to be a year of significant change. One thing that will change is 2008 will be the last year for a Chapter 7 resolution on Iraq. So early in the new year, we'll begin negotiating a long-term strategic partnership that will encompass the status of our forces for the period after 2008. And there will be very substantial changes in calendars in this process. Our two governments will need to decide what our role will be looking ahead. There will be issues of detainees and detention authorities. As Iraq acquires further control over its own affairs with an end to Chapter 7, it will also be accepting considerable additional responsibilities that it will have to prepare for.
There certainly are ample challenges out there in the new year. In some respects, the positive developments in the latter half of 2007 also represent the challenges of 2008. The return of refugees -- a good thing obviously, but a process is going to have to be carefully managed so that it doesn't sow the seeds of new tension and instability.
The concerned local citizens -- an absolutely critical component in the security success of the surge -- and yet they also present a challenge. They have got to be accommodated in some way that meets their needs and their concerns. But this has to be done in a way that also ensures that other elements of the population and the government are comfortable with it. So they and we will have that out in front of us.
There will be the ongoing challenges of reconciliation. And if there is a single overarching issue that will determine the future of this country, that's it for me in one word. There has been, I think, definite signs of progress toward reconciliation, more inter-communal actions and interaction, but still I think very, very considerable challenges. The wounds of the sectarian violence of 2006 and the first part of this year are still very, very fresh and will not be easy to overcome.
And there will be substantial challenges ahead in the field of governance and rule of law. The Iraqis are going to have to tackle seriously some of the problems of corruption, which is as we all know deeply corrosive to the entire effort to build a modern state.
And finally, there will be the issues of the neighbors in 2008. Looking back over the last couple of months, we think we've seen some signs of -- some indicators of the Iranians using some influence to bring down violence from extremist Shia militias. How lasting a phenomenon that will be and how Iran will define and play its role in Iraq in 2008 I think is going to be very important to the long-term future of the country.
We've seen the difficulties between Turkey and the PKK and the response by the Turks to PKK terrorism through targeted strikes, a reminder that what crosses Iraq's borders can also affect stability not only in Iraq and in the region.
So again, there will be a great deal out there in 2008 to give both all of you and me full-time jobs. That would be my one confident prediction for the new year.
Your questions?
QUESTION: Just briefly on Iran again, and something that (inaudible) published this morning. Have you set a date yet for these meetings to ensue? And prior to the meetings here in Baghdad with Iran, Iraq and the U.S., have you been in discussions with Tehran at all from this -- either at the State Department level in Washington or here?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: No. No, there has been no direct interaction since our last round at the beginning of August. And we've gone back and forth on dates and have not yet closed on one, but I expect this is going to happen in the next couple of weeks.
QUESTION: Is it just scheduling issues or is it more than that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes, it's been -- it's scheduling issues, basically.
QUESTION: Thank you.
QUESTION: On the Awakening movement, how difficult do you see the reining in of -- do you think that it can get out of hand in terms of some of the fires and if they're not re-accommodated by the Iraqi Government, how much of a challenge will it be for the U.S.?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, the whole logic of this from the beginning from our point of view was not to have the Awakening movement or the concerned local citizens groups be standalones for an indefinite period. We have always felt that they have to link up to the Government of Iraq. That's got to happen or nothing good is coming down the line.
The nature of those linkages are still something we're working through. I think it's very clear to all of us that the numbers involved now are at a level where it makes no sense to try and accommodate them all into Iraqi security forces. And we're involved now with the Iraqi Government in looking at what they can do and what we can do in non-security employment generation.
Where I would see this going in 2008 is, you know, a certain number will transition to Iraqi security forces. The others -- and it will be a much larger number -- will need to be moved into civilian jobs. We've just gone through a negotiation with the Ministry of Finance where they're going to match $155 million from us in employment creation funds with an equivalent amount of their own. And this will be non-security related employment. That transition needs to take place in the course of 2008.
QUESTION: Have you gotten them to agree to any kind of a specific timeline on this, on making this happen? I mean, when is the recruitment going to begin? When are these -- what people have I guess referred to as like a civilian job corps program -- when is it actually going to start for them?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: In a concrete sense, I mean, it already has started, using U.S. assistance funds. USAID's Community Stabilization Program has a significant job creation element in it, and that's already in train. And we reached agreement in the last couple of weeks with the Ministry of Finance on their $155 million package. Now, they are -- they and we I think will be involved in a -- will have to work out how they're going to organize to make it effective. But that I expect would happen in the early part of 2008.
And then, of course, eventually, like a lot of other things, it'll be a kind of an extended handoff. I mean, we'll do job creation for a while, but the Iraqi Government, as it will have to do in a number of other areas, is going to have to pick up the larger and larger share of this as we move ahead.
QUESTION: From Associated Press. On the job creation issue, I was just curious what type of vocations they envisage for 75 percent of these 70,000-odd people. And it looks like these Awakening councils are growing. They could be as large as 100-115,000 people. What are they -- where do they expect to create these type of jobs?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: There is -- as we are discovering in other aspects of our assistance programs, there is significant demand for skilled labor. As you know if you're following these things closely, one of the difficulties we've encountered with some of our legacy Iraqi reconstruction fund projects is getting people to run the whatever it is we've just built. So again, the employment opportunities are definitely there. Just facilities that we've been involved in the construction of, you know, there's probably thousands of jobs out there.
But you touch on a good point. This will require a significant degree of, I think, vocational ed/job training, and that's that it's not just swinging a pick, it's doing something a little higher tech. And that’s, again, something we're already involved in on our side and it's a subject of discussion with the Iraqis of cranking up a significant level of vocational education.
QUESTION: How do you feel about what seems to be a fairly widespread animosity toward the Iraqi Government from a lot of these volunteers? Is that a worry?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It's both a worry and not a surprise. I think what is going to be so important in 2008 is that two things happen: that these CLC members perceive that this government, of which they are rather suspicious, is prepared to do something good for them and their families; that they see a concrete, measurable benefit in an association with that government because that government is giving them a job and giving them a future; and through that same process, that the government comes to see these individuals as people who want a better life for their families and a better state for the country. And 2008 is going to be very important trying to move that in both directions.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) tackle the good things that happened with regards to the surge, and how disappointing is it that we haven't had a political surge at the same time? And laws like the hydrocarbon law, for example, haven't been passed yet. And when do you think that's going to pass?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, one thing I learned probably in week two of my tenure in Iraq is do not make predictions tied to dates on the calendar, so I'm not. Clearly, we would have liked to have seen, as would the Iraqis, more national level political progress. I'm not entirely sure how realistic some of our expectations were given the climate in the country engendered by the substantial sectarian violence. But it is something that is going to need to happen because, again, grassroots level reconciliation accomplishes a lot of things, economic infusions accomplish a lot more. But you also have to have that kind of national level dimension to this.
And this I think is as important in terms of process as it may be in terms of specific legislative initiatives. The process of consultation among the leadership agreed to in August, at the end of August when the leaders announced their communiqué, needs to be implemented using the so-called 3+1 mechanism, or the 3+1+1. Everybody knows the Iraqi calculus here, or at least higher mathematics. That's the three members of the Presidency Council plus the Prime Minister plus the President of the Kurdish Regional Government. That process we hope will take serious root because it's important as a consultative vehicle as much as it is as a means to legislate events.
With respect to the legislative agenda, the two issues now before the parliament are the budget and de-Baathification reform. We would hope to see both of those passed soon after the CoR reconvenes. I think probably the next major legislative initiative that will move forward is going to be provincial powers, and that is going to be very important in determining the relationship between the provinces and the center. For Americans, I mean, that's the states rights issues, which took us the better part of a hundred years to get right and had a rather nasty interlude there in the mid 1860s while we sorted it out with violence.
Hydrocarbons -- I think a successful provincial powers process could add momentum to the hydrocarbons issues because part of that debate is, again, what accrues to the provinces, or in this case the region, versus what is the authority of the central government. If some of these are sorted out on the macro level through a provincial powers legislation, it may make some of this easier.
But hydrocarbons, the whole package -- revenue sharing plus basic oil law plus the structure of the oil sector -- that's going to continue to be a challenge. I mean, the good news there in that whole issue that perhaps the most important part of it, revenue sharing, is taking place without a revenue sharing law. I mean, budget resources are going to the provinces without a law in place. It needs to happen, but it's working in the meantime.
QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, you touched on corruption and I'm wondering if you can talk about how satisfied you are or aren't with the MOI's efforts to root out corruption, what has he done or what have you?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The MOI in the course of the last year has -- and this is not purely a corruption issue, but the ministry has replaced, as I understand it, every single brigade commander in the national police.
QUESTION: How many?
GENERAL BERGNER: I think nine, but I'll confirm that.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes, I think it is. It's nine or ten.
GENERAL BERGNER: Nine or ten.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes. It's clearly important, as much as an indication that the government is recognizing they got a problem, does this fix the problem? No, but it's a place to start. There's -- to put it mildly, there is a lot of work to do in the Ministry of Interior and with national policemen.
QUESTION: Would you say, at least with the sacking of the nine or ten, would you -- can you characterize it as a satisfied or --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, as an indication of a seriousness of purpose, a determination to move forward, yes. As an end state, no, not yet.
QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit more about Iran and the role you think that it's playing in the stabilization or destabilization of Iraq, and particularly what links they might have regarding the nuclear program -- those issues there? Are they using it against each other, and how that might be viewed from Washington?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That would be a -- the latter half, that would be a great question to ask in Washington. One point on which we and the Iranians have agreed and have -- both of us have abided by that agreement is that our discussions here in Iraq are restricted to issues involving Iraqi security. They have not sought to intrude any other issues into these discussions, nor have we, nor would we accept it if they did. So we are in agreement at least on that, that the focus is security.
In terms of what the Iranians are doing, and I preface this by saying I'm very cautious about predicting or analyzing what the Iranians are doing because, you know, we're not there, and it is an extremely complex society and polity and I don't pretend to have great insight into how things actually are working.
But we have seen a reduction in violent actions on the part of extremist militias -- not an elimination, but a reduction. We've seen a reduction in indirect fire. We have seen Moqtada al-Sadr's, of course, call for a freeze and then his call for a renewal of that. The Iranians are indicating, not directly to us but to others, that they have had a role in all of this. If that's the case, it's a good thing.
On the other hand, you know, we have seen that EFP attacks continue, although again at perhaps at some lessened state. The assassination of the police chief in Babel, a very sophisticated EFP device. So if it's a case of the Iranians moving down a road of using influence to reduce rather than foment violence, that's a good thing. They would still, in our view, clearly have some way to go.
QUESTION: Following up on that, Associated Press. Following up on the Iran Talks we've had Iraqi open source information about the Iranians that the reason they're stalling or finding scheduling problems is that they are seeking meetings at a higher level than the level of experts. Are you at all considering having the meeting at a higher level than the level of experts?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes, I would be open on this. We could do it at the experts level, we could do it at my level. We've done it both ways in the past. Those are the two options.
QUESTION: The Ambassadorial level?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Yes?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes, that'd be -- I would definitely see that as a possibility.
QUESTION: Have you discussed that by way of the Iraqis with the Iranians pertaining to the Ambassadorial level?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: We're sort of looking at what it is we might talk about, which I think is, you know, the first and necessary step for deciding who talks about it.
QUESTION: At what point will you -- will the United States be able to shift from the wait and see to deciding that Iran definitely has made a conscious decision to scale back? It seems like, you know, everyone talks about how the numbers of EFPs have dropped considerably, indirect attacks have plummeted; and yet, at the same time, everyone says but we're still in a wait-and-see mode. At what point do you say, okay, we're convinced things have really changed?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, it's sort of tactical versus strategic. You know, we've seen phenomenon -- a reduction in the levels of these kinds of actions. Okay. Why is that the case? You know, is it a conscious policy decision on the part of the Iranian Government to use all of its influence to bring these things down, which would be strategic? Or does it represent a desire on the part of Sadr to get better control over his organization and so it's a temporary kind of reorganizational role, something like that? Or does it involve the Iranians saying let's throttle it back, get everybody comfortable, and then put the pedal down again? I don't have the answers to those questions.
QUESTION: But when these numbers were higher, I mean, the message -- we heard often that it was -- it was a strategic decision by the highest levels of the Iranian Government to do this, and so it seemed the -- we were collectively clear about why this was happening when the levels were higher. So when the levels are lower, wouldn't it also follow that it's a conscious decision to limit it?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, with going back to my original caveat that I make no claims to expertise in reading the decision-making process in Iran, it would nonetheless be my assumption that the way they're structured that decisions either to increase or decrease would be very senior-level decisions. It's just what lies behind the decision to decrease. Does it mean Iran is now fully committed to a stable, secure, democratic Iraq? Or are there other considerations in play that we may not be able to see?
QUESTION: How crucial is that decrease decision at a high level -- how crucial is that for the long-term stability of Iraq? If they don't make it, what will happen?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: For the long-term stability of Iraq?
QUESTION: Yes. Do they have to make -- does Iran have to be involved for Iraq to progress and stabilize?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I think that as we have seen in the past, that if the Iranians want instability in Iraq, they are well-positioned to create it and create it in substantial amounts. Can they themselves exercise sufficient negative influence to prevent the emergence of a stable Iraqi state? I'm not sure because there are, as we have seen, I think, real limits to Iran's negative influence. By the end of August when Sadr announced his freeze, those of you who were here at the time recall that there were an awful lot of very unhappy southern Shia, unhappy over Jaish al-Mahdi, unhappy over Sadr and unhappy over the Iranians. So it could be that Iran's negative influence is to some extent a self-limiting phenomenon; at a certain point, you get a popular backlash.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.) Just a couple of loose ends on this. First of all, you mentioned Babil. Are you saying that was definitely Shia on Shia violence? And if so, what evidence do you have for that?
And secondly, why -- if you're not prepared to speculate about -- you say you don't know about why Iran is doing what it's doing, who told you that it is doing that, and what did the people who told you that it is doing that tell you about why they're doing it?
(Laughter.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That's the kind of question that could only be asked in Iraq.
(Laughter.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: On the first, the device was a sophisticated EFP and we have seen previously that the EFPs, or at least high-end EFPS, require a process, a sophisticated process to fabricate that has been an Iranian process.
On the second, we have heard this from the Iraqis. And in terms of speculation, it's just that. Some of our friends here believe that there has been a strategic reassessment in Iran that is now manifesting itself in reduced levels of violence. Others are not so sure.
QUESTION: When you say the Iraqis, do you mean government, officials in government or parties within government, part of, semi-outside government?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: All of the above.
QUESTION: Sir, how much credence do you give yourself -- because as far as I know, basically the ceasefire is based on a fatwa of some kind that Moqtada will renew his six-month ceasefire. He issued a document, I believe, on December 9th asking for more piety in religious education for his people, which had been interpreted as some kind of a renewal of the decision. Is there something more concrete that we could just -- that someone could point to?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: No, and again, I think like other things here, we'll simply have to see what happens. At the time of the original announcement, yes, interesting; let's see if it translates out on the ground. I mean, it would kind of be the same situation.
QUESTION: Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post. If sectarian violence and Shia violence continues to go down, will you anticipate more intercommunal struggling, much like what we're seeing in the south? Is that something that you think could happen?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes, yes, I'm pretty cautious about sweeping predictions, but you know, there's a tremendous amount still to be sorted out in Iraq politically. You know it as well or better than I. It's why, for example, that I think among priorities moving in to 2008 provincial elections has to be on the list. Most Iraqis hold that you've got to get a provincial powers law through before you can do an elections law and provincial elections. While that doesn't seem to be a legal requirement, it may be a practical political requirement.
Whatever the case, I think that whether you're looking at the south and unresolved issues and tensions as to who will wield how much power where, places like Anbar where the tribes, having not participated in previous elections, find themselves in a position of some prominence, yet without representation and established political structures or moving through Salah ad Din, Diyala, Ninewa, it's probably going to be fairly important to have elections, say within the coming year, as a means of, you know, regulating this competition.
MODERATOR: I think we've got time for two or three more at the most.
QUESTION: Ambassador, speaking about (inaudible) Shiites (inaudible) how would you link the (inaudible) Iranians and Iranian efforts to (inaudible)? Because most of the time the U.S. military has often said that most of the Shiites and especially those coming from the (inaudible). And his call of freezing the militia came out at the same time the Iranian influence started showing in terms of (inaudible). So how much do you link these two events?
And using this (inaudible) freezing of the militia (inaudible) thinking in terms of trying to revive the issue of dismantling the Shia militias (inaudible)? Everybody is speaking about the CLCs and trying to control them, and they do not be controlled (inaudible) at a later date. But you (inaudible) speaking of (inaudible) that issues seems to have just been gone off the horizon. Nobody talks about it.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, on the first, again, I can only guess, and probably not very well, at the interplay there. You know, if -- you know, if Sadr has stated the policy and the Iranians used their influence to make it stick in the areas where -- like the special groups where they've got far more sway than he does, then, you know, it's a positive result. But I cannot begin to pretend I have insight into that dynamic.
No, actually, the issue of extremist Shia militias is very much on our mind, and that's what underlies all of this. I think there are two sets of challenges. One is, again, the so-called special groups. And again, you're all here; you know the freeze, by no means, means that these guys have gone out of business. They're still active, and we and the Iraqis are still active against them and we will continue to be.
There is another, literally less visible but perhaps even greater challenge out there, and that is in those areas where Jaish al-Mahdi has gone, as I've said previously, from being Jaish al-Mahdi militant to being Jaish al-Mahdi, Incorporated, still very much existing as a militia structure, just smart enough not to be carrying arms through the streets, and in effect controlling various neighborhoods -- jobs, real estate, gasoline, what have you. That as a long-term challenge is going to be huge and it's a challenge, again, that the Iraqis with us supporting in ways that make sense are going to have to really get at in 2008.
QUESTION: What's your take on the Prime Minister's intentions and standing these days? Why is the 3+1 group that was ratified in August still not in shape or doesn't seem to be working?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The Prime Minister has been clear with us that he wants to make that mechanism work and he'll have his opportunity in the new year. There clearly are tensions among the leadership. There's no question about it and you can't wave a wand over them and make them go away. But I think it is important that the sources of these tensions be thrashed out among them, and that's the point of the 3+1.
One thing that I have found that is somewhat tough to do is just everybody in the same time zone at the same moment. We went through an extensive period after the end of August in which -- I mean a very extensive period, in which the 3+1 were never in Iraq at the same time together. That would also be the case right now, as a matter of fact.
MODERATOR: One last one. Anybody who has not had a chance?
QUESTION: Lennox Samuels from Newsweek. I wanted to ask a question about the IHT. Inasmuch as the United States has not moved to hand over people like Hasaf (ph) and Hashim (ph), what is your -- what is your posture, your attitude, your view of the court in terms of its effectiveness? And what is the principal reason that there's this reluctance, if there's a reluctance to hand over some of these people? Is it the confusion that you see in various disparate politicians here, or what's behind that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, our -- let me be clear on this. This has nothing to do, from our perspective, with the IHT or its verdict. The reason we still have these individuals is because subsequent to the verdict a constitutional disagreement emerged between the Prime Minister's office and the Presidency Council with kind of two distinct and clearly conflicting views. And our position has been, look, you cannot expect us, the United States, to sort out an Iraqi constitutional question, particularly on something as serious as a capital case. That has got to be worked out among the Iraqi leaders. And you know, when it is, then we will do whatever you tell us to do; but right now, it's a situation in which there are two opposing views on how this should move forward, and we're not going to be the ones to resolve which view prevails.
MODERATOR: I think we can do this very last one here.
QUESTION: Just one thing we hadn't talked about, Turkey. They bombed again yesterday. Seems to be becoming a sort of regular thing. And you know, the Turks said on the record that the US deconflicted the airspace. Are you now reading a modus operandi where basically the Turks have carte blanche to do small-scale things like this, like these bombings and the occasional raid?
And also just one other quick question. On the Iranian things, of course, we actually had a date. There was a date that Zebari announced that you guys confirmed, and you said you would hold the talks. And then it was cancelled, sort of right at the last minute with the scheduling thing. It kind of sudden and they said that you're still discussing exactly what would be discussed and at what level the talks would take place. It kind of sounds like something confusing happened there. How did that sort of snafu come about?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, on the first, I think we've been clear on this. PKK is a terrorist organization. It has carried out a number of lethal actions inside Turkey from bases in Iraq and the Turks clearly have the right to defend their country and their people. At the same time, we've also said that we all have a pretty substantial interest in the stability of Iraq, and I think none of us want to see operations pursued in a manner that can threaten basic stability inside Iraq. And you will recall in the case of the -- what was it, the December 16th -- yes, a week ago today, the December 16 actions -- we expressed some concerns over the way that was coordinated.
So again, it's Iraq. Nothing -- you know, nothing's easy. And the issue of the PKK, Turkey, the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish Regional Government, it's going to be a -- continue to be a complex equation in which certainly the three governments concerned -- Turkey, Iraq and the U.S. -- are going to have to coordinate and communicate very carefully to see that as we move forward that we're achieving our goals, which is an end to the capacity of the PKK to operate against Turkey from Iraq, which all three of us are clear that we want to see, but to do that in a way that does not create problems of instability inside Iraq.
With regard to the negotiations about negotiations with the Iranians, I wouldn't read anything into it in particular. They have proposed dates. We have proposed dates. They've counter-proposed. I can't remember how the schedule eventually conflicted, but now we're in discussion through the Iraqis both on finding a mutually agreeable date and looking at what a good agenda for those talks might be, and that they will happen.
QUESTION: Sir, just on the Turkey --
MODERATOR: We've got to wrap it up.
QUESTION: It's just a follow-up on the Turkey thing. It's just you said the crucial thing is not to destabilize Iraq. The Turks actually came and they killed a lot of people in this last strike yesterday, and the Iraqis are saying they didn't kill anybody. And any indication of who's telling the truth? (Laughter.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I have not seen any battle damage assessment. I really don't know.
Okay, thank you all.