2007 Press Releases
Press Conference Call with Ambassador Ryan Crocker
December 27, 2007
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Hi, it's Ryan Crocker. Happy Holidays to everyone. I would just say very briefly that 2007 in Iraq ends in a considerably better place than it began. This by no means suggests that all is golden, but the descending levels of violence, improvements in economic activity, the whole Anbar phenomenon that has spread to Baghdad to other Sunni areas, and the less dramatic, but I think also very significant Shia reaction against violent militia activity that produced the Sadr freeze order to Jaish al-Mahdi in August that remains in effect, by no means a complete shutdown of violence, but much less than it had been.
And in this improved climate, we're just seeing more political activity; Sunnis and Shia reaching across to each other, Vice President Hashimi going down to make his first visit ever to Ayatollah Sistani, Hashimi was just up in the north signing a political agreement with the two Kurdish parties, meetings between the Anbar sheikhs and the Karbala Shia sheikhs that would have been unthinkable six months ago, some refugee returns, agreement on postponing the Article 140 process, and even some national-level legislative movement with the 2008 budget now in front of the Council of Representatives and it's a very bold budget, incidentally, with a lot going into investment, particularly in the provinces, de-Baath reform, the accountability and justice bill also in front of parliament for its final reading. And the cabinet passed an amnesty bill to the parliament the day before yesterday.
Again, you know, we're just seeing more of a positive spiral, if you will, all engendered by the security improvement. That said, 2008 is going to have its challenges without question internally in the region, the Kurdish-Turkish issue, the role of Iran, tensions within communities among Sunnis, among Shia, problems with corruption. It's all out there to be dealt with, but moving out of 2007, I have to say I'm feeling a lot more encouraged than when I got here last March. And with that, I'm happy to hear what's on your mind.
QUESTION: Ambassador, hi, this is Jackson Diehl of the Washington Post. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what the political reactions you're beginning to see, if any, to the beginnings of U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq and what you anticipate -- I know you don't like to prognosticate about Iraq, but what do you anticipate the political reactions might be as the troop withdrawals go forward in 2008?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I -- at this stage, I'm not sure I can characterize a distinct political reaction. I think the whole process -- you know, the President's statement in September intending to be down to pre-surge levels by summer of 2008, plus the process we've been engaged on the last month or two, the declaration of our intention to reach a long-term strategic partnership agreement in 2008 that will replace Security Council resolutions and take Iraq out of Chapter 7. I think all of this has Iraqis from all communities looking ahead to the responsibilities they're going to have themselves to ensure both political, economic, and literal security. But we've been clear that our withdrawals are going to be conditions-based. And what I have not detected has been a great deal of nervousness that we're just suddenly going to pull the plug on this and allow things to spiral back down.
QUESTION: Do you think anybody is waiting us out? You know, you hear some reports that there are militias and groups out there that are simply waiting for the surge to be wound down before they start up again.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You know, anything is possible. You know, that is not something exactly unforeseen to us or to the Iraqis, which is why we're making such an effort with them to go after extremist militias, both Sunni and Shia. That said, though, and I'd put this squarely in the challenge column, the problem of embedded militia influence, I think, will be one of the major challenges of 2008.
Whether you can call it waiting us out or not, I don't know, but what I'd refer to as, for example, in Baghdad districts, the phenomenon of Jaish al-Mahdi militants becoming Jaish al-Mahdi Incorporated, where they're not shooting up the streets, but they may be controlling jobs, controlling real estate, controlling gas stations. The Iraqis are going to have to find a way to replace militia control with state control, where the government is stepping up and providing the services as well as the security and not the militias. That will be a challenge.
MODERATOR: Who's next?
QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, Charles Krauthammer. Could you tell us about the Shiite awakening, the Shiite side of these very brutal groups, how extensive is it spreading and could you tell us what role you think Iran is playing? We hear about the pullback. There are disputes about whether -- how real that is and how significant it is. Could you speculate about that a little bit and tell us also about the Shiites coming over on the ground and in Iraq and so?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: This has several dimensions. In the greater Baghdad and the Diyala areas where there are mixed communities, we have seen and very much encouraged, along with the Iraqi Government, the phenomenon of Shia and mixed groups of concerned local citizens. And we now have areas in Baghdad where their concerned local citizens groups are composed of both communities, others where because of the just demographics, it's mainly Shia. The numbers are less than the Sunnis, clearly, but it is an important phenomenon and I think those reflect this general phenomenon of Iraqi rejection of extremism. There is a -- that's one part of it.
Another is what we're seeing in the south where, as you know, coalition force presence is not as extensive as it is in, let's say, Baghdad or Anbar, but which -- in Najaf and Karbala, centers of Sadrist influence since 2003. And that, to my mind, has pressed in a most significant development, where, after the violence in Karbala at the end of August when over 50 people were killed, mainly at the hands of Jaish al-Mahdi, by extremists around the two shrines, people just broadly said "We are sick of this."
Now that hasn't translated as concretely or clearly into concerned local citizens groups. But we have seen several moments, some pro-government, some more independent, some centered on the Shia tribes that are, in a sense, saying some of the same things we've heard from the Sunnis that we want stability, we want security, we want economic opportunity, we do not want the extremists.
Where does Iran figure in all of this? Again, I'm pretty modest about what I claim to know about Iran since -- haven't been in that country in a quarter of a century. But I think they can recognize that where they were in support for Shia extremists was not winning hearts and minds. It is unclear to me how much of what we've seen in the throttling back, Sadr's announcement and so forth, of the extremist militia activity represents an Iranian effort, how much of it is Sadrist leaders simply recognizing where good politics lie. But hey, you know, if it's moving in a positive direction, I'm prepared to give credit fairly liberally.
We would expect to have another round with the Iranians in the coming week or so. It's really a question of working out a date. And, you know, we're hearing from the Iraqis what the Iranians are telling them. It will be interesting to see what the Iranians have to say themselves directly to us about their position on the militias.
QUESTION: This is you meeting with who?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: This next round may be what we call a working group level or experts level. We do these, you know, on two levels. I think we're probably going to do this one one notch below me, also an ambassador. We've got no end to ambassadors out here.
QUESTION: And what are the Iraqis telling you what the Iranians are telling them?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Say again?
QUESTION: You said the Iraqis have been telling you what the Iranians have been telling them. What have they been saying?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That the Iranians are saying that they, Iran, are using their influence to ensure that Jaish al-Mahdi and any other elements where they may have control behave in a peaceful, restrained way that supports the efforts of the Government of Iraq to provide security.
QUESTION: So do you have -- this is Morton Kondrake. Do you have any notion of what the Iranian motives are for that, whether they're waiting us out or whether this is some change of strategy on their part?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I approach this with, you know, a great deal of caution. I make no claim to --
QUESTION: This is David --
OPERATOR: (Inaudible) has joined the conference.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: -- be able to read Iranian motivations. And it's entirely possible that this is tactical on their part; buy time, wait us out. It's also possible that they may be recognizing where their long-term best strategic interests lie, which, in my view, is in a stable, secure democratic Iraq. But you know, I'm making no assumptions. We've got our eyes open. We're watching it carefully. Definitely ready to engage and try to do what we can to continue to move things in a positive direction, but I am handing out no certificates of good behavior.
QUESTION: Ambassador, this is Fred Barnes. Can reconciliation in Iraq continue at a really -- in a really significant way without the national government acting?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Clearly, the national government has to act and to some degree, they're doing that. On the economy, as you know, they've done a pretty fair job of getting budget resources out to the provinces, all of the provinces, predominantly Sunni as well as Shia, in a manner that is generally perceived as equitable. And indeed, the -- you know, the first province, they've got a budget supplemental. The Iraqis have now discovered the supplemental process was the province of Anbar in September. The central government gave them an additional $70 million for 2007.
So you know, you keep clearly in mind out here that one tremendous asset the Iraqis have is literally having assets. You know, they've got money and we have put a lot of emphasis on helping them with budget formulation and budget execution in the provinces as well as the center. And we're seeing 2007 -- vastly better execution and the provinces know where it comes from. This is all Baghdad-driven. So on the economic side, you can say quite literally that they are paying for reconciliation. On the national legislative level, of course, the budget is part of that. That has been a slow, painful process.
We do have the de-Baath reform up; third and final reading right after the new year and that should go through. They also, of course, passed a pension law last month and that, in a sense, is the dividend end of de-Baathification reform because it has -- it's extended pension payments to tens of thousands of Iraqis who had been ruled ineligible previously because their years in service were in service to the old regime. This new law corrects that, so that's important in reconciliation.
And then the amnesty bill that was just passed by the cabinet two days ago; also important in that regard; they've got a long way to go. The biggest legislative challenge in the new year, I think, will be provincial powers, which is kind of a set of states' rights issues. But they are making some progress. They are going to have to make more, because I think it is absolutely true, you're not going to get as far down the national reconciliation road as they need to get without the central government doing more than they have so far.
QUESTION: Ambassador, if I can just follow on that. It's Jackson Diehl again. In your briefing with reporters there the other day, you expressed a certain amount of -- it sounded like frustration about not being able to get the 3+1 to all be in Iraq at the same time, much less sit down together and work some of these things out. Is there -- can you foresee some larger effort that might be made to get at least those -- that group to focus more on striking some of these deals in the next few months?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: There actually is that effort underway. That was the key theme when Secretary Rice was out here about 10 days ago. I have followed that up. I was just in Iraqi Kurdistan yesterday and met with both -- together with both President Talabani and Massoud Barzani and really stressed on this point that they produced a good communiqué at the end of August, the five principle leaders. They need to see it through. And that is the responsibility on all of them, not only on the Prime Minister.
And what we're hearing back from the Presidency Council, as well as from the Prime Minister, is that in the new year, they are determined to make the 3+1 or the 3+2, counting Barzani, work as a vehicle for consultation and decision-making. You know, obviously, we'll see. But I have felt that as we all take stock at the end of the year, there is a sense that because of the security gain, that there is something to build on, but that that building needs to get underway. I'll track that, in part, by the rate of absenteeism. One of my real pet peeves out here is if I'm here, where is everybody else? (Laughter.)
QUESTION: All right. It's Morton Kondrake. One of the critiques that various panels made was that the secure -- that the Interior Ministry was dysfunctional and was -- that the militias were -- the police were ready with militias and so on. What is -- what progress is there on that score?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, work has been done. There is more work to do. The Interior Ministry has now replaced the commander of every single one of the national police brigades, which is nine or ten. And what I'm hearing from my military colleagues is that this plus other reform efforts are having an effect, that the national police is performing better, and what's really crucial is more broadly accepted on the part of the population than it was at the early stages of the surge.
It's going to be awhile, to tell you frankly, before any areas of Baghdad are going to welcome the national police on their streets. But I'm somewhat encouraged that we don't have denial on the part of the Prime Minister or the Interior Minister. They did make these changes and we're seeing some results out of those changes. They're going to have to keep at it because it's -- you know, how the police are viewed is, I think, going to be a critical issue, long term, in both the areas of reconciliation and ultimately stability.
QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, this is Max Boot. Related to that is a question about, how are efforts to incorporate the concerned local citizens under the ISF, how are those efforts progressing? Because obviously, there's been a lot of resistance at the national level to that.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It is progressing. I think part of this process has been understanding that with the numbers involved, you know, we're north of 70,000 now -- this can easily go to 100 -- that incorporation of all of them, or even the majority of them into the security forces isn't really going to be possible or desirable. And this -- you know, that acknowledgement, I think, lessens the concerns on the part of the government and other than political life here, that this whole thing will be kind of militiaizing security.
So basically, we're part probably looking at 75 percent of the concerned local citizens going into non-security employment. And we've got a major effort underway marshalling U.S. programs through -- primarily through USAID as well as the military to see that they're lining up with the CLCs in providing job opportunities. And we're also working that with the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government, for example, has just agreed to match $150 million of our funds with the same amount -- 155 million, same amount from the Iraqi Ministry of Finance for employment creation in the civil sector and this will also involve a major vocational training element. And you know, as we make a major push in this direction, the allergies about incorporation of lesser numbers of the CLCs in security services goes down. So I think we're, you know, cautiously on the right track here.
QUESTION: Ambassador, it's Juan Williams. What do you think about as you -- end of the year, how do you assess Maliki's leadership and is there any chance, going into '08, that he would be replaced?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, he's -- I've only been here nine months, but I've spent a lot of time with him. You know, he's -- and when I whine and moan about absenteeism, that doesn't include -- that does not include Maliki. He is almost always on station. He's committed. He's dedicated. He is a person of great personal courage, which he demonstrated down in Karbala at the end of summer. You know, we would like to see him operate more effectively as head of government. I think he'd like to see the same thing.
In terms of longevity of governments, well, it's kind of interesting. It's -- you know, it is a democratic system of parliamentary democracy and Maliki himself is now a party -- directly controls only a minority of seats in the Council of Representatives. He has to have a coalition to keep going and it's a pretty broad one as you know. It's kind of going to be up to coalition partners. If -- maybe find it's not working, they have the means to bring pressure for change one way or the other.
QUESTION: Ambassador, this is --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That's going to be for them to work out.
QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, this is Victor Hanson. Would you characterize the regional players, specifically Syria, Iran or Saudi Arabia, their role in Iraq is unchanged or improved or problematic? How would you characterize what these players are doing right now or --
OPERATOR: Juan Williams has left the conference.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It's -- problematic is probably a pretty good term. You know, in the case of Syria, there have been some indications of lessening numbers of foreign fighters/suicide bombers coming across their border. But that, as far as we can tell, still remains the primary conduit for people who do some really nasty things out here.
I made a swing through the neighborhood at the beginning of last month and was talking to the Arab neighbors and I find them complaining about Iranian influence in Iraq, yet themselves absent. There's not a single Arab ambassador in Baghdad. Now we understand the security concerns, but those can be managed as we prove out here every day.
I think it is past time for Arab states to step up and be an active and positive influence in Iraq as security improves and, you know, that frankly has been a little bit limited thus far. With -- you know, again, they need to understand that Iraq is a multiethnic state. It is, in a very important way, an Arab state, and that means both its Sunni and its Shia elements. It is a grave mistake to -- on the part of any of Iraq's neighbors, to somehow equate Iraqi Shia with Iranians. Those Iraqi Shia died by the tens of thousands fighting for their country in the Iran-Iraq war against Iran. But the Arabs, simply put, need to do more.
The Turkish-Kurdish issue is obviously a serious one and, you know, an example of all the different challenges that we and Iraq face both internally and with respect to its neighbors. The Iraqis, both the central government and the regional government in Kurdistan, need to find a way to eliminate the PKK presence as a terrorist threat to its neighbors and mainly to Turkey. And I think the Turks, for their part, while justified in taking whatever action, can defend their borders and their citizens. They've got to be careful not to act in a way that can destabilize Iraq at a critical time. So again, Iran we already talked about. Iraq is enormously complex in its own terms. It also exists in an enormously complex region and we're going to have to be working on all those fronts in 2008.
QUESTION: It's Morton Kondrake. Just to follow up on that, the Jim Jones study group that was there last year said that border security was a paramount issue that hadn't been addressed. Is border security any better?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Border security, I think, is better. In terms of the development of Iraq's security capabilities, they're better across the board and that includes their border security element. You know, that said, border security is only going to work if the neighbors also cooperate to make it work. And again, a position of Iran in that respect -- has the longest border with Iraq -- is problematic, as is that of Syria. And the Turkish-Iraqi border, if you've been up there, you know, that is a huge challenge because of the topography. So with the -- those security forces, I think, have definitely made progress. They have, like all of Iraq's security forces, a distance to cover. But ultimately, for Iraq to have fully secure borders, it's got to have neighbors who are equally committed to that proposition. And in the case of Iran and Syria, that is not yet the case.
QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, Charles Krauthammer again. When are the next national elections and are the Iraqis and the Americans working to change it from a list system to a constituency system?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The elections must occur by the end of 2009. Again, this being a parliamentary democracy, they could be called earlier. But they have to take place by the end of 2009. There is a lot of discussion on the basis for elections. And again, as we -- as they consider provincial powers legislation, following on from that will be provincial elections which can and should, in my view, take place before 2009. A lot of feeling that the closed list system did not serve the country well, that -- you know, nothing here is unanimous, I'm learning. But there's a very broad weight of opinion that says it should not be closed list.
Beyond that, you have some who favor an open list system and some who favor a constituency-based system. This is going to need to be something they hammer out and that is actively being debated. But it's pretty clear that both at the closed list system -- that was the basis for the past elections -- has some significant flaws inherent in it and secondly that Iraqis, broadly speaking, recognize that. So I would hazard to guess that when elections are held, whether provincial or national, it is going to be on a different system.
QUESTION: Is that a constitutional issue or a statutory one?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That is a statutory issue.
QUESTION: Okay. Ambassador, you said earlier that you think Iraqis don't feel as though we are going to abandon them precipitously and let things spiral back downward. Is that because of the negotiations that are going on about the future basing arrangements or troop deployments or is it because they've been watching our politics back here and have come to the conclusion that the momentum towards a quick withdrawal has stopped?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I think it -- the answer to that would probably vary, depending on the level of sophistication of the person you asked. I think at the most fundamental level, there is a view that things are moving in the right direction, that security is improving, that the surge has worked, that Iraqi forces are increasingly more numerous and more capable and therefore, you know, why on earth did we abandon a winning proposition.
MODERATOR: Okay. Make this the last one. If there's one more question?
QUESTION: Yeah. This is Fred Barnes. You mentioned a moment ago that there's not a single ambassador from an Arab country in Baghdad at the moment. Is that because they're just not there or have none of those countries actually sent ambassadors ever?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That's why I made the comment about understanding the security risks, because many of the Arab neighbors did have embassies here in 2004, but many of those embassies then came under attack. And you know, the Egyptian Ambassador was assassinated, the Bahrainian Ambassador was badly wounded, for example. What I might point to them at this juncture is that there has been a significant change and it is possible, as a number of European states have demonstrated, to operate relatively secure embassies, but you know, they started out here. They then -- when the going got rough, they got out. And they need to, I think, reevaluate where they are now.
MODERATOR: Okay. Well, thank you all, gentlemen, for taking time out from your post-holiday here and thanks to the Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.