Embassy News
Interview of Ambassador Ryan Crocker with Leila Fadel of McClatchy
March 4, 2008
QUESTION: -- and all the people that live in the area (inaudible) I guess they got knocks on the door the night before and they were like, do your errands tonight. You're not allowed out of your houses in the morning.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That's the other headline there. It says the Iranian President prefers the car over the helicopter.
QUESTION: I mean, he talked a lot about how everybody hates the Americans, but he forgot to mention that nobody likes the Iranians either.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I was going to say, I mean, be careful. That could be beauty contest we might actually win. I mean --
QUESTION: Well, also the protests that were going on, I talked to journalists whose cameras were being confiscated by the Iraq army.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Really?
QUESTION: They weren't allowed to take pictures of the protest.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Really?
QUESTION: Like in Gazaliya, we had a reporter for the Guardian (inaudible), he was out there trying to take pictures and they basically said, do you want to be in the back of our humvee or do you want us give us your -- do you want us to tear your camera off (inaudible) pictures? So I think they were trying to keep that very quiet.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, they he didn't do such a swell job, did they?
QUESTION: No.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, listen, congratulations. I think that is just terrific, that Polk award. Wow.
QUESTION: Thank you.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I mean, that's nice to see that, you know, they paid attention to somebody doing serious journalism for a change.
QUESTION: Thank you, because we were quite surprised.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Thank you.
QUESTION: We have a really good Iraqi staff at our bureau that has a lot to do with (inaudible).
MODERATOR: Did you go back and get it?
QUESTION: I did in April.
MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: Yeah, that's a lot -- yeah, I don't know much about it because, you know, I was not expecting to get anything.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Really?
QUESTION: No, I mean, I just -- it was the last thing on my mind. I was in Kurdistan when they called me and I thought it was a joke. I had to call my editor to make sure nobody was playing a prank on me. So it was pretty exciting. But so it's been, I think, a year since I talked to you.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah, a little less.
QUESTION: A little less; end of March or beginning of April.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It was early April, I think.
QUESTION: So I remember the last time we talked and you told me that in Iraq we were in the first half -- the first reel of a five-reel movie. Where are we now?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, you know, we're still in that first reel.
QUESTION: Really?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Or maybe a better way to put it would be that we're out of the first reel and into the second, but Iraqi Media Productions, Incorporated, just keeps adding on reels on the far side that, you know, as progress is made it clears away some of the smoke and dust that maybe has obscured challenges down the road, so you see those with greater clarity.
It is going to be a long, long process of building and developing a stable state and society. That doesn't mean that it's not working. In contrary, I think the security gains are showing that it is working, but also just how complex and long term the project's going to be, you know, making government really work. The institutions are established, but now the machinery has to actually move; and you know, as peace returns to the streets of Baghdad, you just then see what remains to be done: provision of services, the government being present, schools getting opened, schools getting opened with teachers in them, the electrical grid getting repaired and then having the power to make the grid work. All these things are out there. They're being worked on. They're going to take time.
QUESTION: Do you think that peace has returned to the streets of Baghdad?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I think I had just been in Dora on my first visit when I saw you and I remember telling you, you know, just what a shock that was. I was back there on Friday and that is, you know, a completely transformed area, where you kind of felt like an idiot walking around in a helmet and a flack jacket, so I took them off.
QUESTION: So you didn't do that this time?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah, I started out in a helmet. I felt silly. You know, people are back; businesses are open; the schools are open; kids were everywhere. You know, I remember the first time, one of the things that struck me is that I saw almost no children. Kids were still -- I saw almost no people. There were maybe 14 shops open in the Dora market. There are 650 now. And just a few days before, or the day before -- well, a couple days before -- you know, tens of thousands of Shia pilgrims went through Dora on their way to Karbala.
QUESTION: Yeah, all there was was like one (inaudible).
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It was virtually incident free. And the people I talked to were very proud of it. They said they set out stands offering food and drink. And they told me that a number of Sunnis had actually joined the procession, just had gone on to Karbala. You know, that was totally unimaginable when I went through there in 2007. I mean, nobody could have walked through Dora to Karbala or anywhere else. I mean, you couldn't have driven through there in anything but an M-1 tank.
So, yes, peace has certainly returned to the streets of Dora. Now, then, the challenges: How do you sustain it? How do you sustain it politically? How do you sustain it economically? And that's -- those are the challenges of 2008 and beyond: dealing with the concerned local citizens, the volunteers, as most Iraqis label them; providing services so people see there is a government; getting economic activity reinvigorated; and you know, there is still the big-picture political reconciliation stuff that obviously has to -- has to move forward.
QUESTION: I remember also -- this was a little bit after we talked at a roundtable that you did -- that you said the most difficult part of your job was getting people in the same room together and just having them talk to each other. Has that changed at all? I mean, what's the most difficult part of your job?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It depends on the day. (Laughter.) There's definitely been progress there just in setting up structures. The, as you know, president, two vice presidents, prime minister, who've now established themselves as the executive council, what was informally referred to as the "three plus one" is now more formal, an executive council. There is a secretariat. They have pledged to meet weekly, which they did until Maliki's emergency London visit. But they're back at it meeting -- is it tomorrow that -- what did (inaudible) say? The executive council is meeting tomorrow?
MODERATOR: (Inaudible) tomorrow, three plus one.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And then the other thing that they've reinvigorated is the political council for national security, which also meets tomorrow, the understanding that the executive council will meet weekly, the political council for national security will meet every two weeks. And that brings in, of course, the speaker of parliament and the heads of other main parties, such as the Dawa. And now, I think by informal understanding, any party with at least 10 members of the council of representatives, so you've got Saleh al-Mutlaq and -- is there anybody else?
MODERATOR: And the Sadrists, weren't they?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, Sadrists were always part of it. But the additions, I know Saleh al-Mutlaq is now there. So in terms of getting people into the room, there has been progress.
QUESTION: The benchmarks, I think one of the legislative benchmarks that actually passed (inaudible) provincial powers law was kicked back to parliament, are those something that you use as measurements, or -- the oil law hasn't passed. The provincial power law -- the Sadrists are very, very upset about the provincial powers law.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah, you know, I don't use the term "benchmarks" very often. And as I've said repeatedly, you could achieve every single benchmark on the list and not have political reconciliation. Conversely, you can make a whole lot of progress and not have many benchmarks. You know, Shia pilgrims being able to walk through Dora isn't the result of any benchmark achieved or not achieved.
That said, the exercise is important and we focus a lot of effort on it because --I said this earlier -- I mean, kind of the big picture reconciliation process does have importance that laws are put in place that, sort of, declare that Iraq is about reconciliation and not about retribution. But I'm not sure the laws themselves bring that about.
It may be more the other way around that a mood of reconciliation, a sense that it's time to stop trying to exact revenge, then gives you an environment in which you can get the legislation through, like on pensions and accountability and justice.
On provincial powers, it's a fascinating debate, you know, the principal issue on which it turns -- whether the central government can have any role in removing a provincial governor. And the sharpest debate, of course, is not along the sectarian or ethnic lines. It's within the Shiite community. And it may well be that given the significance of the issue, that you've got to go through this kind of process; that there is simply no easy fix, that you get the votes, you pass the law, but if it has exacerbated rather than ameliorated sharp differences, it may not be a good thing. So, you know, the checks and balances here may, in the long run, be extremely healthy for the country to see that these things are hammered out.
Now -- this is the point I've been making, I just made in meetings today -- they have to be hammered out. I think it would not be at all good for everybody to just say, oh, this is just too hard to do, let's just shove it in a door somewhere. But I sense that's not the case, that there is a lot of engagement in the presidency council with the speaker even before parliament returns to try and figure out a way forward.
QUESTION: I think the estimate is that $250 million is being spent in Iraq a day, and you were saying that in the end this is going to take a long time. Do you think that America has the patience for that, and do you think it's really worth it to spend that much money to get results that may or may not come?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, when you look at the results over the past year, I think clearly we've shown that our engagement here makes a difference and it does make things better. And you know this place as well as anyone. I mean, clearly what happened this past year would not have happened with this surge, without our sustained effort. And to turn this into sustainable security with all the factors I noted, means we've got to stay with this.
Does it mean that we have to continue a resource and troop commitment at current levels through however many reels this film turns out to be? No, absolutely not. We are already redeploying troops, as you know.
And one of the main challenges, we and the Iraqis agree, is they have to develop the capacity to spend their own resources. So I would expect to see, as this moves ahead, that our commitment and our costs in terms of both people and resources is going to diminish.
That said, for the time being, both are, I think, critically important. And on resources Iraqis are working at the capacity -- on capacity, but a lot of the programs that make a crucial difference at street level, whether it's the military CERF (ph) programs or USAID's programs, such as community stabilization that give people jobs and make things better in neighborhoods, we can deliver on that. The Iraqis are not yet at the point where they could make these programs work by themselves. They've got to get to that point. That's why our emphasis has shifted from infrastructure to capacity building, to help the Iraqis operate effectively as a government at all levels, you know, at the federal, the provincial, the district, and the local levels. That's what PRTs and their brigade counterparts do with some pretty good effect.
So the whole process is going to be a very long haul. It will increasingly be an Iraqi process. Our commitment is going to be very important. That commitment should be increasingly less costly as time goes by; but I think it's vital that we stay with it because the costs of failure, I continue to believe, would be pretty dramatic and for us to walk away from this now, I think, would send Iraq, the region, and us down that road to failure.
QUESTION: Do you have concern that the campaigns in the United States, everything that's knocking Iraq off the front page, you know, that the key issue that seems to be especially on the Democratic side is that they want to start pulling people back. They're sick of it.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Look, I'm pretty careful to not take positions on American politics, but I have said all along that we all want this to take less of our resources, and nothing is more precious than our human resources that we've put into this fight. But as you -- if you're going to withdraw troops, as we are, you have to do it on the basis of conditions, that the conditions permit you to take forces out of a given area.
You have to assess what those conditions are. You have to assess not only what the conditions are as of now but how they are likely to change with our redeployment because it will cause all the pieces to realign themselves. So you've got to think through that.
If you decide you're going to do it a different way, timetable versus conditions, then I think you have to look very seriously at the possible consequences and I think the risks are just way, way too high to make me comfortable with that.
QUESTION: The Sahwas, or the Sons of Iraq, or whatever they're called these days because the names change, do you have any concern about that? I mean, I've traveled to neighborhoods where it seems like every neighborhood has their own local war lord, basically. I mean, (inaudible). In some cases, I feel that people -- that they've gotten out of control. They're taking people's homes and they're forcing them to buy their own homes back if they left the area in (inaudible). They're taking people's shops in some cases. I've heard of people, you know, being beaten for saying the wrong thing to the leader of the local Awakening Council or Sons of Iraq group.
Is that something that is concerning to you at all with this program? Because this program has been part of the success here and part of the drop in violence.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Absolutely. Well, look, everything is a concern virtually because, you know, everything is fragile. As much progress as there has been, it's always reversible, which means dealing with the Sahwas is pretty important. It's a main subject of our focus, working with the groups themselves and working with the Iraqi Government because ultimately, and this again all part of the transition that I was talking about, these movements need to transition into something that is purely Iraqi.
About 20 percent -- the agreed target is about 20 percent of them will go into security forces, and the Iraqi government is processing names, instructing the ministry of the interior to issue hiring orders. Young men are going into the police college, which is -- we keep expanding it, but it's good we do because it's maxed out in terms of capacity.
So that process needs to continue; vital for the integration of the Sahwas. Also vital to give Iraq what it has not need and so badly needs, which is local policing. My own view is one of the reasons things went so badly wrong is that there was nobody from neighborhoods keeping order in neighborhoods. So that's key.
Equally key is the other 80 percent. I've had several conversations with the prime minister, an exchange of letters. He is fully committed to a civilian jobs program, as well as vocational training and so forth. We've talked to the minister of finance. This will be a top budget priority. They've already matched funds with us, 150 million for each government for a first-phase employment program.
So that's -- I mean, everything is linked to everything else. This is part of reconciliation. It's part of the integration of the Sahwas. It's part of creating effective local policing. It's part of the Iraqis developing the capacity to implement these programs. Its part of Iraq -- of the transition from, you know, our funds to their funds. So it's -- you know, it's just a good metaphor for everything that needs to be dealt with.
Now, in terms of their current position and actions, you know, we've been very, very focused on ensuring that the Sahwas are definitely part of the solution and not part of a new problem, which means we watch them closely. We insist on their linkage to the Iraqi security forces. I know in the Dora area, because I just asked, our commanders there, boy, watch this closely, get on any complaint of misbehavior and deal with it pretty firmly. The incidents you mentioned, I would just have to assume these get to the attention of U.S. and Iraqi commanders and --
QUESTION: Well, I know in Amariya they don't because there's a -- there's a culture of fear similar to what we talked about under Saddam Hussein specifically in that (inaudible.) The people we tried to talk to all said they were threatened with death if the Americans or journalists got wind of it because (inaudible). But they may -- I know that in Diyala, they did get wind of (inaudible) Shia (inaudible) apparently from (inaudible) organizations, and I don't know how widespread it is. I don't know if it's three neighborhoods that we happened to latch onto or more or less, but it's a huge amount of people.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, and that's --
QUESTION: 88,000, 88,500 or more. I haven't checked in two weeks, so it might be more now.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Is that --
QUESTION: Yeah, I mean, every week it changes, sometimes by thousands, sometimes by hundreds. So it's pretty high. And I think it's more than that because I know that in certain places they'll divide the money in half and they give their extra guys not on the payroll, like, 150 each instead of the 300.
The other thing I wanted to ask you is, of course, the Iran trip recently. The President came here and spent a lot of time talking about the U.S. -- well, the foreign powers and their role here and they should leave and nobody likes them. How do you react to that, if you react to that at all?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, with a certain amount of wry amusement. I wonder if president Ahmadi-Nejad reflected on the fact that were it not for our efforts, in conjunction obviously with the Iraqi forces, there was no way he could have made that drive in from the airport and certainly not from Karada to Kadamiya. His whole visit was possible because of the improvement in security conditions that we and the Iraqis have worked so hard to achieve. And of course, he can also drive around because he doesn't presumably have to worry too much about Iranian-funded extremist militias going after him.
QUESTION: Yeah, he did mention that, you know, that the Iraqi (inaudible) were not good because (inaudible). He also said that he was still committed to the talks with the United States. Are you still committed to those talks?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, we've been saying now for months we're ready to have a dialogue to continue the talks. The Iranians have postponed two or three times now. So, you know, we'll see where we are in the wake of the visit.
QUESTION: Has there been any progress because of the first three talks that you see? Do you feel that there's been tangible progress because of those talks?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: There's nothing I can point to and say that this is a direct and positive result of those talks. You know, we have seen developments such as the Sadr suspension of operations announced in August, then just renewed. The Iranians have told Iraqi counterparts that they were the decisive voice in this. Maybe, maybe not. I don't know. You can certainly explain Sadr's decision purely in Iraqi terms.
And that, incidentally, is another important indication, I think, of change and progress: the popular reaction against violence and those who practice it. Most dramatically, you've seen it among the Sunnis, of course, in the awakenings, but also among the Shia. Remember the reaction in Karbala and beyond to the Jaish al-Mahdi attacks in Karbala during the Shabania, and people were really mad. And it was just a few days after that that Sadr announced a ceasefire. So this may have had far more to do with his own reading of the popular mood and anything the Iranians did or did not do.
In terms of other indicators, again, very hard to tell. EFP attacks go up and down. I don't see any positive pattern there that I could attribute to the Iranians. We believe they continue to train Iraqis for the militias, and we know it because we picked up some of these guys and they've told us they've been trained in Iran.
QUESTION: But they still deny that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Right. So in general, no, I cannot point to anything in particular and say it's a result of these talks. I still think it's worth continuing the effort. This is important, obviously, and I've always felt that, from an Iranian perspective, a carefully calculated assessment of their own long-term interests as opposed to the short-term desire to cause us difficulty would have them very much in support of a stable, secure, democratic Iraq because that's the kind of Iraq that isn't ever again going to do what Saddam did.
QUESTION: They sort of say the same thing on the other side, you know, that there's been progress and they don't know if the U.S. is sincere when they come to these meetings. But I was wondering why they continue if both sides are unsure if they're doing anything.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, you know, again, I think you have to take a long-term view of this. It is the only authorized direct channel we have with the Iranians, and I think we should continue to see what might develop out of it.
QUESTION: Do you think Muqtada al-Sadr's future role in Iraq -- do you think that's been diminished at all or is he a more important political player now?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It's a great question. Of course, for most of the year that I've been here, Muqtada has not. Except for literally a few weeks, he's been in Iran this whole time. And I have to think that negatively affects his position here. It's hard to control a movement if you're not located with it.
That said, the Sadr trend is an important element in Iraqi politics, clearly. When Sayyad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr founded the movement, he touched that reservoir of Iraq nationalist, Arab nationalist and disenfranchised spirit that no other movement really had. It's a little like, you know, what Imam Mussa Sadr did in Lebanon in the late 70s of the Harakat al-Mahrumin, the Movement of the Deprived, that out of which grew the AMAL movement, and, you know, down different roads with Hezbollah. So that sentiment, that mood, is very much out there. I'm not sure that Sayyad Muqtada al-Sadr has been able to really capture it fully.
QUESTION: Being in Iran hasn't exactly helped the Iraqi Arab nationalist feeling (inaudible) --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And that's the ironic thing about it all. I mean, when this emerged in the '90s, it found its definition in opposition to both the West and Iran.
QUESTION: Even in the beginning of this war, before 2005 it was --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It was --
QUESTION: -- anti-Iranian.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: -- anti-Iranian.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, again, I hope President Ahmadi-Nejad is not deluding himself about attitudes in Iraq, that Iraqi Shia are Iraqi and they're Arab and they're proud of both, and everybody remembers the Iran-Iraq war and that it's a different country; you know, that it's a different country, it's a different people, and he -- you know, he spoke of the history in the past.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It's been a very problematic history. But that mood, that sentiment's out there, and I think the provincial elections are going to be very important. I'm pleased that everyone has affirmed that those elections should take place this fall. That's a way of sorting out an awful lot of things. And it's the right way to sort it out, you know, in terms of who speaks for whom. That's what voters get to decide, and I think this can be extremely important just at every level, between communities, within communities. It's the critical step, again, in this long evolution of a state and a society. And clearly, within the Shia community, Dawa's supreme council, Sadr Fadila, these elections are going to be hotly contested.
QUESTION: Within the Shia community, I mean, do you worry at all about the (inaudible) conflicts? I mean, the way it's always cast now is the Sadrists are saying (inaudible) just attacking us, arresting us, harass our families because we are standing down. And a lot of people that we talked to after (inaudible) extension was that they felt humiliated that they still couldn't fight back in places like (inaudible) still fighting, but in places Zewani and Najaf, and those places where (inaudible) is very, very dominant.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah, again, the list of things to worry about and the challenges to be faced is a pretty long list indeed, and certainly one of the items on it would be that. There's been an enormous amount of progress in bringing down sectarian violence and, you know, that is probably the single most destructive element as we saw here. That has to continue to be a main focus of concentration.
But, you know, as things evolve, stresses and tensions within communities also have to be dealt with. And they're not just among the Shia. You know, among the Sunnis with the awakenings out in Anbar versus the establishment of political structures like the Islamic Party, and among the awakening itself as we've seen (inaudible). Different sheikhs, different views, different attitudes; and I think you'll see more of this. But again, it takes you back to elections. I mean, that's how these things ultimately must be sorted out. You take it to the people because, again, conflict within communities can be not quite as but very devastating to Iraq's future.
QUESTION: We're coming up on the fifth anniversary of this war. It's the first year I would say that I've ever seen a change in a positive direction (inaudible) backwards. One of my staff members always describes it as taking one step back to square one. I don't know if you (inaudible) but he always describes, every time something seems a little better, he's like, "Well, we're almost back to square one."
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: (Laughter.) Journalistic cynicism.
QUESTION: He's from Fallujah, so --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, so he knows whereof he speaks.
QUESTION: And he -- you know, what is this next year, what is the focus going to be on? What are we supposed to expect changes (inaudible)? What are the biggest challenges that you see that we face?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, the first priority is what I just said; it's security. Violence has been driven down substantially. Clearly, we've got to keep it down and push it down still further. You know, this year has shown that security is the lynchpin. If you've got it then other things start happening. If you don't, nothing good happens. So we cannot lose sight of that focus.
As we focus on the things that are now both possible and necessary because of improved security, and that's again what we were talking about, it's better government performance in providing services, in providing employment opportunities, in demonstrating to the Iraqi people that it is an effective and even-handed government and that it is spending Iraq's resources for the general betterment.
QUESTION: You mean they don't do that right now at all? I mean, (inaudible) Iraqi people's minds.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Exactly. Well, it is fascinating going around to some of the areas for a second visit, you know, having heard the first six months I was here, security, security, security. Very few people are talking about security now. It's how come the power doesn't work; my cousin needs a job; we have never seen a single soul from the municipality. It's that kind of thing. So it's -- and the government is aware of it. I tell you, my last set of meetings with the prime minister, it's all about electricity, what more can be done to get the power on. He's feeling the pressure. So that whole set of issues of effective governance is a very big challenge for 2008.
On the political level, elections. Getting the provincial elections organized and conducted in a secure environment is, I think, the single largest thing that will happen. There are another set of complex issues out there that will have to be managed -- and, again, because it's Iraq everything's hard and everything is connected to everything else, the Article 140 process.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And the whole question of hydrocarbons. And again, these all link up. So again, not every problem can be solved, but these are issues that certainly do have to be managed. I don't know how long it will take to sort out all of 140, but it's certainly good that there is an awareness of the problem and good that the UN is focused on this. And I'd count that as another major step forward: the re-engagement, if you will, of the UN in Iraq.
The new special representative of the secretary general has brought a lot energy in and he's bringing a lot of people in. You know, they've raised their personnel ceiling substantially. The specialized agencies are getting pushed very hard from us and from the SRSG to get their people on the ground. UNHCR is now bringing in permanent international staff to deal with returning refugees and IDPs.
QUESTION: Are you dealing at all with plans, making plans for refugees returning them back to (inaudible)? Is the embassy doing anything?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, no, we're -- look, we're involved in everything. (Laughter.) But we work very closely with the UN and with the Iraqi Government, both USAID and the political section. We have a refugee coordinator's office.
QUESTION: Is there an actual plan or are they just going to get to come back? Because a lot of the houses that were abandoned are now occupied.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Right. Yeah, you know, this is an issue in which ultimately a plan has to be an Iraqi plan. A lot is getting done just on local levels. You know, I saw this when I was in Dora. The brigade task force there in conjunction with Iraqi counterparts is working out a process that ensures the right people get into the right houses. And obviously, there are going to have to be adjustments for the reasons you cite. And the whole process also needs to be managed so that we don't have people moving back in large numbers to unsettled neighborhoods and through that very movement kind of touch off a new round of violence.
So I've had several conversations with the prime minister on that. He's formed an inter-ministerial committee with the minister of migration at the head of it. We and UNHCR are engaged primarily through that ministry, and it's going to be a long, complex, uneven process. Obviously good that people are coming back, but then just trying to manage it is going to be a challenge.
MODERATOR: We've got to --
QUESTION: Okay. Do you think --
MODERATOR: We've got just a couple more minutes.
QUESTION: Just two quick more questions. One, do you think Kirkuk is something that's actually solvable, something that can be solved? When I was up there, it just seemed every side really has become a victim on the ground, if you just talk to the Turkomen or talk to the Arabs that are trying to leave. The Kurds are living in a stadium. Is it something that can actually be solved? There's so much interest between Turkey, the Kurds and the Arab Iraqis there.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You know, hey, we're Americans. That means we think every problem can be solved and this one can, too. But clearly, you know, Article 140 is a very complex set of issues and Kirkuk is the most complex of those. And you know, a solution may be, as I said, through management, managing the problem for a while until we got perhaps a clearer view of what's possible. So taking this by stage is important.
I think speeding up the so-called normalization process of payments to families who are prepared to leave and then assisting them on the other end, that they've got a place to go. You know, that's a process that has seen some reviewed emphasis and could use some more in my view, that, you know, those who are not firmly committed to being in Kirkuk, if they're prepared to go somewhere else then that should be facilitated. And you not only just literally reduce numbers, you also create a dynamic that can engender a little more of a positive attitude.
Again, I think it is important that Kirkuk be resolved. It can only be resolved, I think, as an Iraqi issue. I don't see scope for involvement. You know, this can't be negotiated between Iraq and Turkey, for example. The Turkomens have to be dealt with as the Iraqis they are.
QUESTION: But a lot of people see Kirkuk as maybe the final (inaudible) in the Kurdistan regions that could allow them to have their independence (inaudible). You know, a lot of people see this as the ultimate divisive issue.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, there are so many divisive issues, it's hard to --
QUESTION: -- hard to pick one.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: -- hard to find the ultimate.
QUESTION: I mean, between Kurds and Arabs versus Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs or between the Kurds and Arabs (inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah, and it's -- and that's why it has got to be dealt with carefully, but it has to be dealt with because it's not the only Kurdish-Arab issue by any means. Ninewa is -- and Mosul in particular there are a lot of concerns there. That has to be taken on.
But it's a key point. I mean, that, you know, what is the Iraqi state and who are the Iraqi people, you know, Kurdish aspirations have been present for a very long time and they will continue to be present, but I think it is extremely important that Iraq's Kurds accept as they do that they are part of Iraq and that that, all of Iraq, is their strategic depth. You know, it's a very -- I think it's a good thing that, you know, you have a not only a Kurd but a Kurdish party leader who is the president of Iraq.
QUESTION: Do you think there -- last time we spoke, you talked about needing a national identity, a national vision that didn't really exist at the time. Do you think that they've found that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah, and I was probably overly bleak even then. A strong Iraqi identity, I think, has always existed. What I think may be much more pronounced now is not just national identity, which is a given, but national pride in the sense that it means something to be an Iraqi.
I was talking to -- we had a reception for international visitors, or Iraqis who've gone to the U.S. (inaudible) international visitors program, something that Phil put together, and I was talking to a number of them and was struck by that how they had been so eager to go to the United States and tell Americans that it's not like you see on TV, that's not who we are, a bunch of murdering thugs, and here are the things I do.
MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, and some of the women I talked to were involved in civil society support groups and --
MODERATOR: NGOs.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: There's just a real pride in that. And of course, winning the Asia Cup was --
QUESTION: Yeah, that was a (inaudible) never seen anything like that.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That was huge. And what it shows you, of course, was that there was that kind of repressed spirit that was there. It needed a catalyst and, you know, when that came along the outpouring, I think, tells you just how deep that sense of Iraqi identity is and how ready it is to latch onto something that it can be proud of.
QUESTION: This is my last (inaudible) question. (Inaudible.) It's the Turkey issue.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah.
QUESTION: The Kurds, in general, have felt they're betrayed by the United States during their most recent incursion. They felt that there was ulterior motives behind Turkey (inaudible) and they felt that the U.S. gave them a full green light and gave that to them in the future. I mean, how do you respond to that? I mean, they are the most steadfast ally in Iraq since the beginning of the war.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, it's a misapprehension, as Kurdish leaders know. I was in daily, more than daily, contact with both Barzani and Talabani throughout this, and we were also in constant contact with the Turks. You saw the public statements from the President and Secretary Gates right at the time the Turks concluded their operations. So I can certainly say this, that the Kurdish leadership is aware of and deeply grateful for the efforts we exerted to bring this to a quick conclusion, and they've said as much openly. But this is another one of Iraq's very hard problems.
QUESTION: How long is your list?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I told somebody that it was 187, that I normally fall asleep at night at that point so it may actually be longer.
You have got a terrorist organization on Iraqi territory and attacks are taking place inside of Turkey, the last of which, that bombing directed at Turkish soldiers, the Turks say they are absolutely convinced came out of Iraq.
You know, countries don't sit still for that kind of thing. So what we have said, look, you know, we understand your right to defend your people absolutely, but this is not a problem that's going to be solved by military means alone. It just won't. It's going to take a much more complex effort.
We understand that President Talabani has been invited to Turkey and expects to go in the quite near future. That is a good step. Turks and Iraqis, including Iraqi Kurds, need to sit down and figure out ways to deal with this; a process in which I think we can be helpful, but they're going to have to talk together about how Iraq -- how Turkey fixes its terrorism problem and Iraq gets control of its territory. Because you know, the PKK are no friends of Iraq and certainly no friends of the Iraq's Kurds. They've fought them before and just have an ideology that is fundamentally contrary to that of the KRG itself. I mean, this is a common enemy so there needs to be common cause in figuring out how to deal with it.
QUESTION: Thank you very much.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Great to see you again. Are you just going to keep on keeping on?
QUESTION: It's supposed to be a year longer, but I have this feeling my editor thinks I'm going to be here forever, I think as long as -- that's part of the reason I'm asking you when this is over so I can go home.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, now that you've got the Polk award, you know, I'm not sure they're ever going to let you go.
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